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DUAL RATIONALITY OF SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: CREATION OF NEW RIGHTS 





O Romeo, Romeo,  
Wherefore art thou Romeo?  
Deny thy father and refuse thy name,  
Or if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love,  






    he story of Romeo and Juliet embodies the tragic theme 
of unattainable love, which tugs at the heartstrings of human 
emotions.  Their unattainable love was due in part to the hate 
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1 See The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: Romeo and 
Juliet, Scene II, Act II at http://www-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/romeo 
_juliet/romeo_juliet.2.2.html. The Most Excellent and Lamentable 
Tragedie of Romeo and Juliet, commonly referred to as Romeo and Juliet, 
is famous for a variety of themes, the most popular being love, or more 
notably unattainable love. This particular quote is clearly a recognized 
phrase from Shakespeare’s play. Here, Juliet questions out loud from the 
balcony of her upstairs window, why must the man she love, Romeo have 
the last name of her family’s enemy. But, she also proclaims, if he will 
not deny his family, his name, then she will deny her family, if only he 
will announce his love for her. 
T
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filled feud between Romeo and Juliet’s families.  Juliet’s 
family, the Capulets, despised Romeo’s family, the 
Montagues.  Juliet, however, is not concerned with Romeo’s 
name, as her love for him is greater than her family’s hatred 
for the Montague name, “What’s in a name?  That which we 
call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet,” Juliet 
echoes. 2 
Juliet’s desire to sanctify her love for Romeo symbolizes 
the eternal yearning of most couples to sanctify their union 
via societal approval in the form of a marriage.  Since the 
days of yore, taking the husband’s last name has been the 
symbolic representation of the couple entering into 
matrimony.  What happens when society disapproves of one 
of the spouses because of their last name?  Furthermore, what 
happens when society does not approve of the sexual 
relationship of the individuals who desire to marry?  The 
above saga of Romeo and Juliet showcases these exact 
questions and typifies the power and influence society has in 
either approving or disapproving the behavior of individuals.  
The yearning for recognition, which existed in Romeo and 
Juliet, is reverberated across the length and breadth of this 
country, as same-sex couples3 seek societal approval of their 
love in the form of marriage.  Same-sex couples have been 
staging an uphill battle to gain the right to enter the protective 
paradigm of marriage.  Many same-sex couples face severe 
hardships because they fall outside the umbrella of the full 
legal protection mechanism provided by marriage.  Countless 
same-sex couples enter into loving, lasting relationships like 
their opposite-sex counterparts, yet are denied the very 
fundamental rights that come with such expression of 
exclusive commitment marked by marriage.  
Marriage has profound social, cultural and religious 
meaning in the United States. Since the decision to get 
married is an intensely personal choice, it is impossible to 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 The terms ‘same-sex couple’ and ‘same-sex marriage’ refer to 
individuals that are generally identified as gay, lesbian, or homosexual, 
and having romantic love, and sexual desire for members of the same sex 
and wish to formalize the bond within a legally recognized marriage.   
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enumerate all the reasons why couples decide to marry or to 
define or quantify the significance of the marital relationship 
across all communities and classes of people. In addition to 
the social, cultural, and religious meaning of marriage, it is 
also an important legal relationship.4 
Despite being a private institution, marriage has been 
regulated by societal norms, religious perceptions, and legal 
doctrines.  Although evidence of same-sex relationships 
predate centuries, historically marriage has been viewed as a 
heterosexual union, thereby precluding same-sex 
relationships from the definition of marriage.5  Only recently, 
this complex and often controversial topic has become “part 
of a brave new world of family law that is now beyond the 
                                                 
4 Terence Dougherty, Economic Benefits of Marriage under Federal 
and Oregon Law, 3 (2004), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ 
reports/reports/EconomicBenefitsOR.pdf.  
5 See Don Browning and Elizabeth Marquardt, A Marriage Made in 
History? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A25, available at 
http://www.americanvalues.org/html/marriage_history.html (Historically 
there have been a variety of reasons for society to promote the institution 
of marriage. Often however, the many reasons are overlooked, as 
marriage is inevitably linked with only religious connotations.  But: 
Marriage is frequently characterized as a religious institution 
laden with old prejudices. It is true that Judaism and 
Christianity have contributed much to the Western 
understanding of marriage.  But it is also true that they 
absorbed parts of the secular marital codes of Greek law, 
Aristotelian philosophy, Roman law and German law. Even 
in ancient secular systems, legal marriage was seen as a way 
to help society regulate and achieve a complex set of desires 
and goals: sexual activity, procreation, mutual help and 
affection, and parental care and accountability.  Integrating 
these classic goods into the institution of marriage was a 
task for law, religion and other socializing elements of 
society. And although the religious language of sacrament 
and covenant adds weight to the law of marriage, each of the 
goods of marriage can be identified independently of the 
religious symbols that give them depth. Id.   
See also Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes 
of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002).   
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complete control of either churches or gay rights advocates.”6  
As a result, “nearly a million gays and lesbians identified 
themselves as members of same-sex couples in the 2000 
census.”7  These same couples are being deprived of a bundle 
of rights, granted to opposite sex couples, such as inheritance 
and health care because of their denial of marriage rights 
based on sexual preference or sexual orientation.8 
This unequal treatment of same-sex couples has been the 
focus of numerous judicial and legislative tugs of war over 
the last three decades.9  Proponents both for and against 
                                                 
6 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, GAY MARRIAGE: 
FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE 
EVIDENCE, 9 (2006). 
7 See Margie Mason, Census Figures on Same-Sex Couples, Aug. 8, 
2001, available at http://speakout.com/activism/apstories/10044-1.html. 
For further census statistics in 2004, see generally U.S. Census Bureau, 
America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2004 at Table UC1-UC3,  
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2004.html. 
8 For an excellent compilation of the many state and federal laws, as 
well as other articles on the issue of same-sex marriage, see Paul Axel-
Lute, Same-Sex Marriage, Rutgers- the State University of New Jersey 
School of Law, Newark, Pathfinder Series, available at 
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~axellute/ssm.htm.  
9 Let us consider this tug of war. In the United States, some states do 
provide a variety of benefits to same-sex couples, but have not legalized 
same-sex marriages. Delving a little further, there is a complex web of 
state laws that add to the fog of confusion on the topic of same-sex 
marriage. For example:  
On July 6, 2006, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that 
the New York state government is not required to allow 
same-sex marriage, affirming the constitutionality of a state 
law limiting marriage to a man and a woman. On the same 
day, July 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of Georgia reinstated 
constitutional ban on gay marriage. On July 26, 2006, the 
Washington Supreme Court ruled that the state's DOMA 
was not unconstitutional and therefore same-sex marriage is 
an issue appropriate for the legislature and not the judiciary 
system. Only Massachusetts recognizes same-sex marriage 
Vermont and Connecticut offer civil unions, California, 
New Jersey, Maine and the District of Columbia grant 
benefits through domestic partnerships, and Hawaii has 
reciprocal beneficiary laws. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme 
Court decided Baker v. Vermont , 170 Vt. 194 (1999) that 
their state legislature must establish identical rights for 
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same-sex marriage harbor very strong views.  As a result, the 
last few years have seen the development of a steady stream 
of legal scholarship, either supporting or denigrating the right 
to marry for same-sex couples.10  In various states, the courts 
have been called upon to determine the validity of same-sex 
marriages in their respective states.  Although the states of 
Hawaii11 and Vermont12 came tantalizingly close to bringing 
equality in marriage rights, the state of Massachusetts13 was 
the first state to have finally achieved equality in same-sex 
marriage.  Given the prevailing pulse of society, the stage 
was set for achieving the long-awaited marriage equality.  
The widely anticipated New Jersey Supreme Court ruling of 
Lewis v. Harris
14 again came short of granting equality in 
                                                                                                     
same-sex couples similar to those of married opposite-sex 
couples. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on 
November 18, 2003, ruled in the case of Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), that 
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the 
state's Equal Protection Clause.  
See Wikipedia, Status of Same-Sex Marriage, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Status_of_same-sex_marriage.  
10 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Darren R. Spedale & Hans 
Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Single-Sex 
Marriage, 4 (2004)(abstract available at http://www.bepress. 
com/ils/iss5/art4). 
11 See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 645 (1993) (Hawaii is 
recognized as the first state to allow civil marriages to same-sex couples.  
IN 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that limiting marriage only to 
opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional.  Ultimately though, the state 
Constitution was amended to retain the restriction to marry only for 
opposite-sex couples).   
12  See Baker, 170 Vt. at 194  (The Vermont Supreme Court held that 
same-sex couples must have the same benefits that opposite-couples have.  
The Legislature created the civil union laws to comply with the mandate,) 
13 See Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 309 (The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in 2003 held that restricting same-sex couples from 
privileges of marriage was unconstitutional, and the Court in 2004 also 
held that civil unions were not sufficient in meeting the mandate.  
Therefore, on May 17, 2004 the state of Massachusetts was the first state 
in the United States to approve same-sex marriages). 
14
See Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006) (The New Jersey Supreme 
Court affirmed on October 2006, that same-sex couples must receive the 
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marriage rights for same-sex couples.  Despite the strong 
undercurrent of support percolating across the states, this 
denial in Lewis15 reveals a profound Constitutional issue 
revolving around fundamental rights.16 The ruling did, 
however, send a strong message. The State of New Jersey 
must provide opportunities for same-sex couples to enter into 
legally recognized unions. Furthermore, the Court requires 
the lawmakers to either (i) amend the current marriage 
statutes to allow same-sex couples to obtain equal rights and 
benefits similar to those of opposite-sex couples, or (ii) create 
new statutes with equal rights and privileges for same-sex 
couples within 180 days of the ruling.17  Even with this strong 
message, it is important to analyze why the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey did not invalidate the settled law’s provision 
against same-sex marriage after such extraordinary public 
interest and expectation. 
The ruling recognized civil unions between same-sex 
couples by extending them rights and benefits similar to, but 
not equal to, marriage.  New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine 
signed the ‘Civil Union Bill’ on December 21, 2006,18 while 
expressing his sincere support for same-sex marriage rights.  
Governor Corzine lamented the fact that “society isn’t ready 
for that, although he would sign a bill allowing same-sex 
                                                                                                     
same rights and benefits those opposite-sex couples were guaranteed. In 
December 2006, the Legislature then enacted a civil union statute to 
comply with the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court). 
15 Id. 
16 A journey through the historical archives of constitutional 
development in America will reveal that fundamental rights were created 
by various means. It came out of the Due Process Clause in Roe v. Wade 
which emerged from the Equal Protection Clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma  
as the Court said “fundamental right” “emanates” from the Bill of Rights, 
as shown in Griswold v. Connecticut. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (discussion of the Due Process Clause); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 391 
U.S. 535 (1942) (discussion of the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussion of the Bill of Rights). 
17 Lewis, 188 N.J. 415; see also accompanying text, supra note 14. 
18 See ABC7 Eyewitness News, Garden State Equality's 'Practical 
Guide to Civil Unions', (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://abclocal. 
go.com /wabc/story?section=local&id=4872275. 
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couples to marry.”19  The New Jersey Civil Union Bill is not 
as expansive as many had hoped.20  The right to marry still 
remains unattainable to same-sex couples, as noted in the 
legislation: 
 
The Legislature, however, discerns a clear and 
rational basis for making certain health and 
pension benefits available to dependent 
domestic partners only in the case of domestic 
partnerships in which both persons are of the 
same sex and are therefore unable to enter into 
a marriage with each other that is recognized 
by New Jersey law, unlike persons of the 
opposite sex who are in a domestic partnership 
but have the right to enter into a marriage that 
is recognized by State law and thereby have 
access to these health and pension benefits.21 
                                                 
19 See Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. Civil Unions Hung Up on 'Marriage', 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Dec. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.marriageequalityny.org/2006/12/nj-civil-unions-legislators-
up-on.html. (The Domestic Partnership Act, establishes a domestic 
partner status, and additional rights to same-sex couples that reside 
together, have proven mutual support, concern, and commitment for each 
other). See M. V. Lee Badgett, R. Bradley Sears, and Suzanne Goldberg, 
Supporting Families, Saving Funds: A Fiscal Analysis of New Jersey's 
Domestic Partnership Act, http://www.lsnjlaw.org/english /family/ 
domesticpartnership/njdpa/. Institute of Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies 
(IGLSS) and UCLA's Williams Project on Sexual Orientation Law and 
Public Policy, December 2003. 
20 See e.g., Lewis, 188 N.J. at 448 – 51 (The Domestic Partnership 
Act does not provide for marital property rights or automatic parental 
rights when a child is born to the couple. Also, “[T]he [Domestic 
Partnership] Act has failed to bridge the inequality gap between 
committed same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 
448. “Significantly, the economic and financial inequities that are borne 
by same-sex domestic partners are also borne by their children too.” Id. at 
450. “Even though they are provided fewer benefits and rights [by the 
Act], same-sex couples are subject to more stringent requirements to enter 
into a domestic partnership than opposite-sex couples entering into a 
marriage.” Id. at 451.). 
21 S. 2820, 210th Leg. §e (N.J. 2003), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2002/Bills/S3000/2820_U1.HTM [hereinafter “NJ Domestic 




Economists and fiscal planners have been analyzing and 
dissecting the economic impact of legalizing same-sex 
marriage since the 2004 enactment of the New Jersey 
Domestic Partnership Act.22  Against the backdrop of societal 
awareness of same-sex marriage, coupled with jurisprudential 
precedent set in the state of Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court in New Jersey could very well have granted the right to 
marry for same-sex couples.23  Since the New Jersey Court 
                                                                                                     
Partnership Act”]. See generally STEPHEN J. HYLAND, NEW JERSEY 
DOMESTIC PARTNERS: A LEGAL GUIDE, (2005).  
22 See LSNJ Law, New Jersey’s Domestic Partnership Act, 
http://www.lsnjlaw.org/english/family/domesticpartnership/njdpa/. (The 
New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act includes the following rights and 
responsibilities for those registering under the Act: 1) “The right to decide 
about medical treatment and to visit in the hospital;” 2) “New Jersey state 
tax benefits;” and 3) “Public employee benefits” Id. 
23 See Dr. Nathanial Persily, Expert Comment on Same-Sex Marriage 
in New Jersey, Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.upenn.edu 
/pennnews/article.php?id=1065. New Jersey residents were positively 
anticipating the New Jersey Supreme Court decision as both national and 
the state opinions in New Jersey clearly indicate a trend of growing 
acceptance of same-sex marriage. In a recently conducted University of 
Pennsylvania study, it was shown that when it comes to the issue of same-
sex marriage, many more people support civil unions, granting unmarried 
couples many of the legal rights of marriage. The study showed:   
Our research has found that the backlash that followed the 
Massachusetts court's decision to allow gay marriage has 
completely subsided.  The share of the American public 
supportive of same-sex marriage has returned to the place it 
was before the courts got involved and appears to be on an 
upward trajectory. During that same period, an increasing 
share of the American public became in favor of same-sex 
civil unions that fall short of marriage.  The same-sex 
marriage debate in the courts has moved the national debate 
and public opinion to the left on this issue, even if no other 
state has followed Massachusetts' lead. … Our conclusion is 
that because of the court decisions in 2003 and 2004, the 
debate over same-sex relationships moved to the left, and 
civil unions became the middle position. Id. 
See also, American Civil Liberties Union, State Public Opinion from 
States on Civil Marriage and Other Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships, http://www.aclu.org/getequal/ffm/section78/ 8b4 summary 
.pdf (a Star Ledger/Eagleton-Rutgers - September 2003 Poll reveals the 
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fell short of equalizing marriage rights, the legislature came 
up with the idea of a civil union instead of a marriage right.  
However, it is not the equality long envisioned by the 
proponents of same-sex marriage.24  Why are recognition and 
                                                                                                     
following favorable statistics for same-sex marriage: 43% would allow 
same-sex couples to marry, 52% would allow civil unions, 53% would 
allow legally married same-sex couples from other states who move to NJ 
to be recognized as married in NJ, 60% thought same-sex couples should 
be entitled to health insurance and social security benefits through their 
partners). 
24 Although, marriages between same-sex couples have not been 
recognized officially, there are states that offer something similar, besides 
New Jersey.  See e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (1999) (Vermont 
gives essentially equal treatment to marriage and same-sex civil unions by 
the enactment of a law in response to a state court decision mandating 
civil unions).  See also S.B. 379, 2005 Leg., Gen. Assemb., (Ct. 2005), 
http://hartford.about.com/od/connecticutlaws/Connecticut_Laws.htm 
[follow “Civil Union Law Passes in Connecticut” hyperlink; Scroll to end 
of text, then follow the “view the ‘complete text’” hyperlink] (In 2005, 
Connecticut enacted a law giving essentially equal treatment to marriage 
and same-sex civil unions, thus making it the first state legislature to enact 
civil union law without a court order. In this context, Connecticut State 
Insurance Department says that fully insured health plans are required to 
treat partners in a civil union the same as spouses are treated for purposes 
of health care benefits. However, the full impact on employers that 
sponsor fully insured health care plans is yet to be clarified, as it is not 
clear if they would have to pay for partners in civil unions, raising thereby 
the confusing conundrums the issues of marriage and civil union are 
bringing).  See also Bob Egelko, San Francisco State's Domestic Partner 
Law Survives a Legal Challenge, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON, June 30, 2005, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/30/BAG22DG 
UC31.DTL (California enacted the State Defense of Marriage Act 
(hereafter DOMA), via ballot initiative in 2000, even though it has 
domestic partner laws. From a healthcare point of view, California 
requires all group health care service plans to provide domestic partners 
with health coverage that is equal to what spouses receive. In addition, it 
applies to health care coverage offered by employers, not to self-insured 
health care coverage. What is not clear, however, whether California can 
require an employer that does not offer domestic partner coverage to offer 
or subsidize such coverage when providing an insured plan. In this 
context, it is worth noting that, California’s domestic partner law survived 
a legal challenge, Knight vs. Superior Court, S133961. The State Supreme 
Court rejected arguments that domestic partner law was the equivalent of 
marriage, in a case where the plaintiffs said it violated California’s 
DOMA. State Supreme Court ruled that domestic partnership was not 
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rights of equality so hard to come by?25  While these are 
some of the poignant questions that confront us today, a 
broader economic analysis of the cost-benefit of same-sex 
marriage within New Jersey reveals that the economic impact 
of same-sex marriage is conducive to granting marriage rights 
to same-sex couples.26  The New Jersey legislature’s decision 
                                                                                                     
equal to marriage. As a result, in California, domestic partners are not 
eligible for some state marital benefits and a wide range of federal 
benefits.  As the Court held, “…the domestic- partner law was not equal 
to marriage. The courts noted that partners are ineligible for some state 
marital benefits and a wide range of federal benefits and may be unable to 
get other states to recognize their relationships.”)  
25 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 
26 See M.V. Lee Badgett & r. Bradley Sears, Equal Rights, Fiscal 
Responsibilities:  The Fiscal Impact on AB205 California Budget, 2003, 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/AB205/AB205Study1.pdf  (By 
using data from New Jersey residents in Census 2000 and using 
experiences from other states, Badget and Sears were able to quantify the 
likely fiscal effects of the Domestic Partnership Act (hereafter DPA)). See 
also M.V. Lee Badget, and R. Bradley Sears, Supporting Families, 
Savings Funds: A Fiscal Analysis of New Jersey's Domestic Partnership 
Act, November 2003, http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/ 
publications/NJ-DPAStudy.pdf [hereinafter Supporting Families, Saving 
Funds] (According to them, out of the rights and benefits provided to 
domestic partners in the DPA, only three seem to have any fiscal 
significance : (i) “the State will likely save from $46 to $92 million in 
avoided public assistance expenditures;” Id. at 22. (ii) “covering the 
health insurance of [same-sex] domestic partners of state employees and 
retirees will add approximately $7 million in state expenditures, [not 
withstanding the fact that] [m]aking same-sex domestic partners eligible 
for spousal survivor benefits will probably not result in any increase in 
state expenditures;” Id. (iii) “[t]he State will also experience a loss in 
transfer inheritance tax revenues in the range of $4.3 to $7.8 million.” Id.  
Badget and Sears concluded that the DPA will have a positive impact on 
the state budget. They further noted that, even if their predictions about 
the State's savings from public benefits is too high, their smallest estimate 
for those savings could be reduced by two-thirds, and there would still be 
enough savings to off-set the highest projections for the additional costs 
of providing state employees with same-sex registered domestic partner 
health benefits and the potential loss in inheritance tax revenues. Id. 
Badget and Sears concluded that the net impact of the DPA is over $61 
million in fiscal savings each year and thus, the Domestic Partnership Act 
will provide material support to many New Jersey families without 
placing a strain on the state budget. Id.). 
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to deny marriage equality, therefore, does not reside in the 
budgetary concerns of adverse economics27 nor is it based on 
the practicality of economics,28 but perhaps embedded in the 
deeper sanctum of the Constitution’s fundamental rights 
doctrines. Within these doctrines lies the explanation for 
marriage inequality, particularly within the democratic ideals 
and long standing constitutional jurisprudence of America.   
The liberal movement of granting equal rights of marriage 
to same-sex couples has withstood the agonizing years of 
abhorrence and apathy and dragged through decades of tacit 
approval and silent endorsement.  The issue of marriage 
equality, after having been decided on and permitted in 
Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts, and California, has now 
touched the hallowed halls of the New Jersey Supreme Court.  
Despite evidence of the positive impacts far outweighing the 
negative impacts, the Lewis Court’s implicit recognition of 
marriage equality remains unattainable.   
In an effort to reconcile the inconsistency between liberal 
ideals and inequitable adjudication of marriage rights 
amongst our citizens, this article will seek answers to these 
issues. By straddling the contractual confines of marriage via 
law and economic analysis, Part II of the article explores the 
contractual paradigm of marriage to examine whether the 
framework is independent of sexual orientation and if the 
deliberately incomplete nature of marriage can provide 
consistencies for all types of marriages.  Part III examines 
whether the private aspiration of marriage should necessarily 
                                                 
27 See Supporting Families, Saving Funds, supra note 26 (Economic 
analysis shows that granting marriage rights to same-sex couples could 
bring in substantial budgetary savings to the state. In their study, Badget 
and Sears have shown that depending on the proportion of couples who 
register, the State could save $50 to $100 million in welfare disbursement 
expenditures. They contended, however, “[t]he savings could be 
somewhat less if the State only assesses eligibility based on domestic 
partners' resources for WFNJ/TANF and Medicaid.” Id. at 4. “As a lower 
bound, [however, the study showed] adding the estimates of current 
spending on WFNJ/TANF and Medicaid suggests that the State will save 
from $46.2 to $92.4 million if the FEA [DPA] is enacted.” Id. For their 
calculations, see Id. at 4, Table 2.). 
28 Id at 11. 
70          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
be linked with public consequences by evaluating the impact 
of marriage’s social cost borne by the participants in a 
marriage incongruent with broader societal norms.  Finally 
Part IV engages in an analysis to determine whether equality 
of marriage rights come from creating new constitutional 
rights or it can be achieved by searching the outliers of 
unenumerated rights.  Perhaps, implicit within these threads, 
somewhere buried deep beneath the constitutional labyrinth 
lies the answer to how long it must take to truly incorporate 
the Lewis Court’s insightful view that, “equality of treatment 
is a dominant theme of our laws and a central guarantee of 
our state constitution.”29 
 
II.   DECONSTRUCTING TRADITION: MARRIAGE AS 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACT PARADIGM 
By taking an expansive view of marriage as a social 
contract, it is imperative to understand whether the idea of 
same-sex marriage is inconsistent within the broader 
construct of marriage as an institution.  Although the concept 
of marriage originated from the historical judicial 
interpretation of the union between a man and woman, its 
construct has evolved due to its attendant legal consequences 
and the contractual mechanisms that shape its contours.  As 
newer intimate adult relationships evolve, the nature of 
societal relationships unravel to such an extent that the 
contractual obligations and legal protection surrounding 
marriage take on a more expansive meaning.  Implicit in this 
expanded construct of marriage resides the issue of social 
welfare30 and the impact to third parties or children,31 which 
                                                 
29 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 456 (2006).  
30 See John Fitzgerald, Marriage Prospects and Welfare Use, in 
MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM 
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 177, 177-97 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-
Shechtman ed., 2003). 
31 Perhaps no other entity is impacted so significantly than the 
children. Commentators have noted that, “Children are the most important 
marital-specific asset and one of the main advantages of the family.”   See 
Christina Muller, An Economic Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, in 2002 
GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS art. 14, 6, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=gwp 
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further shapes the contours of marriage’s contractual 
mechanisms.  Therefore, this article will analyze whether the 
institutional structure of marriage requires the conservative 
fundamentals of religious doctrines and gender-centric 
viewpoints for continuation. 
Marriage can be seen as a social contract that brings 
specific legal consequences32 and inherits socio-economic 
impacts that come from its welfare protection mechanism and 
third-party implications.  Among the different types of 
contracts that marriage can encapsulate, several categories are 
more prominent than others: (i) no-fault contract,33 where the 
parties can walk away from the marriage obligation without 
showing any cause for the breakup, (ii) mutual-consent 
contract,34 where both parties are required to come to an 
agreement for dissolution of the contract, (iii) default 
                                                                                                     
(The author of the study presented a utilitarian viewpoint of children as 
public goods for their parents, emphasizing the need for a stable married 
relationship for the development of quality in their offspring. This 
therefore, established how marriage is a vital ingredient for the betterment 
of the next generation of citizens.)  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 156 (5th ed., 1998) (1977) (Posner 
describes a set of advantages arising out of marriage). See also Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: 
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (1999). 
32 See generally Steven E. Landsburg, The Marriage Contract: 
Divorce Is Just a Breakdown in Negotiations, EVERYDAY ECONOMICS, 
Sept. 12, 1997, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2042. 
33 See generally id. (In several states, a no-fault divorce is granted 
when it is not required for either spouse to show fault, or a reason for the 
breakup of the marriage. No-fault, also allows for either spouse to obtain 
a divorce, even if the other spouse does not agree to the divorce. A no-
fault divorce is also granted if the couple has been living separated for 
three years.).  
34 See id. A mutual-consent contract is exactly as it sounds. Both 
spouses agree to end the marriage in a divorce. Mutual-consent divorce 
circumvents the difficult issues that arise in the one-sidedness of no-fault 
divorce, as it does not permit one spouse to divorce without obtaining the 
consent of the other spouse. In mutual-consent divorce process, the 
spouses, instead of the government/judges, make the decisions such as 
custody and how the assets/finances are distributed.   
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contract,35 in which the states will impose laws, without the 
explicit provisions of a premarital contract, and (iv) covenant 
marriage,36 a type of contract that makes it more difficult on 
both parties to dissolve the marriage due to the binding nature 
of the contract. 
The concept of marriage has evolved from the medieval 
marriages of trade-off and arrangements by elders37 to 
marriages that are mergers marked by ideals of individual 
liberty and spousal equality.38  The scope and limitations of 
the marriage contractual construct have expanded.  However, 
within the congruent limits of liberating ideals of spousal 
rights and responsibilities, the understanding of the 
contractual dimension of marriage is still evolving.  While a 
nexus of contract binds the two entities involved in a 
                                                 
35 In various states, a default divorce is granted due to non-
performance by a spouse. Literally, the non-performing spouse defaults 
and therefore, the spouse that originated the filing of the divorce 
documents is generally awarded what was requested in the complaint for 
divorce.  See id. 
36 In general, covenant marriage laws require a couple to follow the 
state law; in addition, the couple must complete marriage counseling prior 
to the marriage and also complete counseling before a divorce is granted.  
See generally Lyle Jones, An Analysis of Covenant Marriage in Arizona: 
as Fault Divorce and Contract, Associated Content (2006), 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/19864/an_analysis_of_covenant
_marriage_in.html. 
37 See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: 
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE (1989) (Mintz and 
Kellogg describe the marriage behaviors of the new Pilgrim immigrants. 
The Pilgrim marriages were controlled and arranged by the parents 
controlling their children as a source of family income. Through dowries 
and inheritance, marriages helped increase family bonds and the ties 
through intermarriage of first cousins, as well as brothers and sisters were 
valuable to facilitate the family wealth, status and political ambitions.). 
38 See Lorna Jorgenson Wendt, Creating a Prenuptial Agreement, 
Equality in Marriage Institute, http://www.equalityinmarriage.org/ 
bmprenup.html (No longer are prenuptial agreements for a select few 
individuals. Regularly, couples preparing for marriage enter into legal 
prenuptial agreements prior to marriage. The prenuptials are designed to 
protect the merger of the two individuals into marriage arrangement. 
Prenuptial agreements are designed to protect the married partnership. 
Creating a postnuptial agreement also “reflects equality in financial 
matters.” Id.). 
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marriage, that nexus is shaped by the relative preferences,39 
economic incentives,40 and game-theoretic decision-
makings41 of the individuals involved.  Although the implicit 
promise of a performance of the contract remains intact, both 
the content and cost of that contract is continuously changing 
within a marriage.  Three fundamental factors distinguish a 
marriage contract from other contractual arrangements.  First, 
there is not just one contract that defines marriage, but a 
multitude of contracts, sometimes inter-connected, often 
concurrent and even embedded within one another, all 
shaping the construct of marriage.  Therefore, a marriage can 
be seen as a nexus of contracts, more like the mechanisms of 
a corporation.  Second, success or failure of the marriage 
contract depends on the relative preferences between the two 
                                                 
39 This is the phenomenon in which agents or entities can affect the 
outcome of an event by tailoring their responses based on relative 
preference between agents in a two-party game, or amongst agents in a 
multi-party game. The assumption in this standard economic model is that 
individuals are rational and they are driven to maximize their expected 
utility. Recent evidence suggests that some agents' utility depends on both 
their own payoff and the payoffs of others. Therefore, an individual's 
satisfaction may depend on how much she receives relative to those in a 
reference group. For an excellent discussion of relative preference, see 
generally Michelle Alexopoulos & Stephen Sapp, Exploring the Behavior 
of Economic Agents: The Role of Relative Preferences, in 12 ECONOMICS 
BULLETIN 1, 1−7 (2006), available at http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt. 
edu/2006/volume12/EB-06L20001A.pdf. 
40 Fitzgerald, supra note 30. 
41 See David K. Levine, What is Game Theory, Department of 
Economics, UCLA, available at 
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/whatis.htm (Focusing on the 
interaction of couples in relationships, in particular marriage is important. 
Particularly, exploring interaction between individuals within the 
marriage, to meet their individual goals, while also working for the 
ultimate good of the marriage relationship. To better understand game-
theoretic decision making, consider that:  
Although game theory is relevant to parlor games such as 
poker or bridge, most research in game theory focuses on 
how groups of people interact. There are two main branches 
of game theory: cooperative and noncooperative game 
theory. Noncooperative game theory deals largely with how 
intelligent individuals interact with one another in an effort 
to achieve their own goals. Id. 
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entities, the asymmetry of economic incentives between the 
two entities, and the game-theoretic decision making between 
the two entities.  These factors change over time resulting in a 
continuous evolution of contracts in both its implicit promise 
and cost of execution, and which makes the marriage contract 
a dynamic self-reinventing nature. Thirdly, if we agree to the 
premise that marriage is a complex web of multiple contracts, 
as evident by constant change, the idea of marriage is best 
encapsulated within an incomplete contract paradigm.42 
 
A. Nexus of Contract View of Marriage 
 
In a marriage, the involved entities are continuously 
entering and exiting various forms of contracts.  More often, 
the performance of a long-term contract is dependent on 
entering into an existing contract from numerous smaller 
intermediate contracts.  This continuous and evolving process 
ends only in the dissolution of marriage.  Furthermore, when 
the dynamic nature of contract formation and contract 
restructuring becomes static, it signals either the marriage is 
approaching termination or was never formalized in the first 
place.  
Some implicit and explicit contractual terms are 
contained within the expansive confines of marriage’s 
contractual obligations.  In addition, marriage involves a 
combination of complete and incomplete sets of contracts.  
Most contractual arrangements of a marriage include a set of 
inter-locking and dynamically interacting sets of complete 
and incomplete contracts, with the majority being incomplete.  
Marriage creates a freestanding entity to pursue a set of 
objectives whose limits are bound by a set of contractual 
agreements.  This entity creates legal rights, social 
responsibilities, and various third party consequences, 
through its formation.  The entity also inherits performance 
expectation and legal consequences as a prerequisite to its 
existence within the society, much like a corporation would.  
                                                 
42 See Saby Ghoshray, Cyberspace Contracting: Embracing 
Incomplete Contract Paradigm in the Wake of UCITA Experience, 11 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 609 (2005).   
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Therefore, the marriage nexus of a contract is treated as an 
entity similar to a corporation.  It could be seen as a quasi-
corporate structure. When a corporation dissolves, the 
constituent elements remain responsible for legally mandated 
performances. Similarly, in a marriage, the constituent 
components become responsible for the legally mandated 
performance as stipulated either by the pre-marital 
contractual arrangements, or by the default provisions of the 
contract implicit within marriage. 
The discussion above begs the questions: Do corporations 
have a specific gender?  Is sexual orientation a mandatory 
requirement for the performance of the corporation?  Could 
the existence of a corporation be denied because of the 
assigned sex to the corporation?  We know that the answer to 
all these questions is negative.  Therefore, if a corporation is 
not dependent on sexual orientation, why then, does sexual 
orientation matter for a marriage to be recognized, nurtured, 
and for it to prosper?  Implicit acceptance of the corporation 
like structure of marriage is consistent with the ideals of 
supporting and legalizing marriage between same-sex 
couples. 
 
B.   Preference, Incentive and Game-Theoretic 
Decision Making: Dynamics of Marriage 
 
The incomplete contract paradigm43 implicit in a marriage 
differs structurally from that of a corporation in its ability to 
dynamically alter the terms and conditions of the marriage.  
In this regard, contractual elements within a corporation are 
more fixed than those contained in a marriage.  This is so, 
because in most marriages, the contractual terms and 
conditions go through a continuous evolution; contractual 
flexibility arrangement that a corporation does not have.  In 
this context, this article identifies three main drivers that 
shape the contractual arrangement in practice within 
marriages.  These are (i) individual preferences of the entities 
involved in a marriage, (ii) their personal incentives, and (iii) 
                                                 
43 Id at 625. 
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game-theoretic decision-making at play for both entities.  For 
explicit purpose of this discussion, this article will consider 
only the relationship of a couple and forgo any discussion on 
polygamous44 and polyandrous marriages.45 
 In a marriage, short-term contracts are created such that 
they are neither definite nor complete contracts due to the 
asymmetry in preferences between the couple.  This 
asymmetry creates unequal and diverging incentives to 
complete the contractual obligations.  As a result, individual 
parties to the contract are driven differently to either 
complete or alter the terms of the contract.  Here, the two 
parties may be sharing the same resources, but each has 
different preferences surrounding the scope and enjoyment of 
those resources.  This in turn drives a bargain mechanism, 
whereby each is influenced differently to complete the 
contract. 
For example, two spouses enter into a contract regarding 
who will wash the dinner dishes.  In this arrangement, the end 
terms are deliberately incomplete, not explicitly specifying 
the consequences for non-performance.  Suppose the 
assignment of performance, doing the dinner dishes, is based 
on the person whose preference will be watching television in 
the evening.  Now, suppose one spouse enjoys football on a 
Sunday evening, the other clearly is interested in reality 
television shows and they are sharing one television set.  
                                                 
44 Polygamy is defined as having more than one spouse at a time, for 
the vast majority this has been reflected in society with the male spouse 
having multiple wives. See generally Danel Bachman & Ronald K. 
Esplin, History of Plural Marriage/Polygamy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
MORMONISM, (1992), available at http://www.lightplanet.com/mormons/ 
daily/history/plural_marriage/History_EOM.htm.  See also Online 
Muslim Matrimonial, Why Polygamy Is Allowed in Islam, 
http://www.ezsoftech.com/omm/polygamy.asp. 
45 See Kelly Stewart, Honey We’re Home, THE DAVIS ENTERPRISE, 
(1997) available at http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/stewart.htm 
(Polyandry is defined as having more than one husband at a time.  
However, the Tibetan culture approves of this style of marriage and 
because of this has become a focus of study for researchers. “Typically in 
a polyandrous system, a woman marries a man plus his brothers, who 
"share" her. Never knowing for certain whether they are fathers or uncles, 
the men treat the children born into the family as their own.” Id.). 
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Here, the preference asymmetry between football and reality 
shows determines the performance of doing the dishes.  Who 
will do the dishes is being kept open because the incentive to 
do the dishes is dependent on the preference over television 
viewing.  Clearly, by giving up the preference of one’s 
chosen television program, the spouse in question could opt 
out of performing the dishes.  The spouse in question could 
re-enter into a second contract of not getting involved into an 
act by altering the conditions of the previous contract, by 
choosing to do the dishes and to also give up watching her 
favorite television show.  The game-theoretic decision-
making enters the dynamics in such that, one spouse knowing 
the preference profile of the other, gets into a contract with 
incentive such that the counterparty will more likely than not 
be unable to perform the contractual obligation.  When 
competing interests of the contract are shaped by relative 
incentives among the participants, each party to the contract 
will try to gain economic advantages by entering into 
contracts based on their expectation of how the other party 
will perform. 
Often times, two spouses enter into a contract via 
bargaining.46  Evidence of contract via bargaining can be seen 
in the framework of prenuptial agreements executed prior to 
marriages.  During the bargaining process, the two parties 
enter into contractual obligations with specified terms and 
conditions of non-performance.  When a particular spouse 
influences the structuring of a particular performance clause, 
like that of the non-performance by the other spouse, it will 
result in a higher economic gain for the counterparty.  If the 
spouse knows the preference of the other and negotiates in 
such a way that the probability of non-performance by such 
counterparty is higher than that of performance, she stands a 
better chance of coming out ahead. 
The foregoing discussion illustrates why keeping the 
contract deliberately incomplete has an economic value 
                                                 
46 See Robert B. Standler, Prenuptial and Postnuptial Law in the 
USA, April 24, 2004, http://www.rbs2.com/dcontract.pdf.  See also 
Hedieh Nasheri, Prenuptial Agreements in the United States: A Need for 
Closer Control? 12 INT'L J.L. POL. & FAM. 307 (1998). 
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higher than that of making it a complete contract.  We have 
shown how asymmetry is a preference and how divergence in 
economic interests creates contractual surplus in contracts 
that contain provisions for changing the definition of 
performance and including a penalty for non-performance.  In 
addition, because of emotional factors involved in marriage, 
the preference profile and incentive structure could change 
for both parties, making it advantageous to deliberately keep 
most contracts incomplete.47 
My analysis above explores the complex web of contracts 
contained within a combination of complete and incomplete 
and implicit and explicit sets of contracts.  In cases where 
complete contracts are available, it is likely that the 
component of completeness is embedded with a larger 
incomplete contract.  Similarly, most implicit contracts 
contain a multitude of smaller explicit contracts.  Implicit 
contracts, by definition, are incomplete.  Therefore, marriage 
in general embodies the incomplete contract paradigm, fully 
laden with interactive manifestation of asymmetric 
preferences and diverging incentives of the parties. 
To conclude this section, it is clear that the performance 
of a marriage is governed by a series of contractual 
arrangements.  The contracts themselves are too numerous, 
widely diverse, and structurally incomplete in nature.  
However, the structure and the performance of these 
contracts are no way dependent on the sexual proclivity of the 
individual parties for the overall function of the marriage 
mechanisms.  Similarly, the mechanism is not influenced for 
its existence or efficient functioning on the sexual orientation 
of the parties involved.  Thus, the corporate-like functional 
identification of marriage is not consistent with the view that 
sexual orientation or sexual preferences of the partners 
determine the characteristics of making a successful 
marriage. 
 
                                                 
47 For a discussion on incomplete contract paradigm, see Saby 
Ghoshray, Cyberspace Contracting, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 609, 
625-26 (2005). 
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III. PRIVATE ASPIRATIONS, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES:  
REGULATING INTIMACY BY IMPOSING SOCIAL COST 
 
Marriage is the culmination of private decisions borne out 
of romantic involvement of two individuals.  Legal 
consequences of marriage allow for immediate amalgamation 
of married couples into the social welfare system.  Marriage 
also brings spontaneous immersion of the individuals within a 
protection paradigm.  With this, an intimate private matter 
now becomes subject to public scrutiny and thus could 
become the focus of public sentiment.  It can be argued, that 
as long as a marriage does not interfere with another 
individual’s rights, there is absolutely no case for denial of 
marriage to any couple, particularly when the denial of 
marriage keeps the couple outside of the legal protection 
paradigm and the social welfare system.48  Within current 
society, marriage immediately brings a couple into a different 
                                                 
48 See Jean L. Cohen, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL 
PARADIGM 6 (2002). (Cohen outlines the history and the recent 
adjustment to the idea of regulating intimacy in society: 
This mode of regulating intimacy had a clear logic: the 
states’ public purpose was to promote heterosexual 
marriage and, within that institution, to support 
reproductive sexuality and shield the family unit. The 
states' privileging of heterosexual monogamous 
marriage and the "natural" patriarchal gender order it 
institutionalized meant that privacy protection was 
limited to the nuclear family unit. The "civil death" of 
the married woman—her lack of legal personality and 
civic equality—fit this model perfectly. 
Correspondingly, states had considerable freedom to 
regulate non- or extramarital intimacies or “public 
morals.”  
     The new constitutional privacy analysis turns this 
approach on its head. It articulates the concept of a right 
to personal privacy as an individual right of ethical 
decisional autonomy (to pursue one's conception of the 
good), control over access and personal information, 
and a new conception of the scope of individual privacy 
that now applies to important aspects of the domain of 
morals, formerly the special preserve (along with health 
and safety) of state regulation. Id. at 6.). 
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protection and welfare umbrella than non-married persons.  
Therefore, the public sentiment about marriage must be 
viewed objectively.  This section attempts to develop a 
framework to understand whether society unjustly imposes 
moral limits and ethical boundaries on private romantic 
relationships.  If society does impose such limits, do they 
have the right?  Can the majority’s rejection of a private 
declaration of intimacy be seen as a cost of social outrage 
within the contractual framework?  Further, does society have 
the right to regulate intimacy and define private romantic 
relationships?  
 
A.   Public Consequences of Private Intimacy 
 
Marriage is a public act of a private decision between two 
individuals.  With the progress of society’s liberal ideals, the 
individuals involved in marriage do so according to their free 
will, without any coercive mechanism at play.  Society views 
marriage as a culmination of private intimacy between two 
consenting adults who want to be bound by the legal 
recognition and consequences of marriage.  Implicit within 
these legal consequences of marriage are the protections of 
marriage, such as social welfare protection and benefits of tax 
redistribution.  When two individuals enter into a 
relationship, there is no limit placed on that relationship from 
a social ordering or economic consequences point of view.  
However, as soon as the relationship becomes transformed 
into marriage, the social order takes over.  
Let us consider the human factor to marriage and the 
tangible protection measures that come from having the right 
to marry.  Consider the frightening scenario of two couples, 
John and Rosa and Juan and Ryan.  
 
On the historic, horrific morning of September 
11, 2001, John kissed his wife, Rosa, goodbye 
before heading to his job as an office-cleaner 
in the World Trade Center’s North Tower.  
Rosa never heard from her husband again. 
After searching frantically for days, Rosa 
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accepted the reality of his disappearance.  She 
filed for a death certificate and arranged her 
husband’s memorial service.  Rosa received 
Workers’ Compensation from the state and a 
small Social Security death benefit from the 
federal government.  She contacted John's 
former employer, who arranged for receipt of 
his pension.  Because John and Rosa had few 
assets, they had never seen the need for a will, 
nor did they have the financial means to hire a 
lawyer to prepare one.  Nonetheless, John's 
assets, which included a small savings 
account, their home and a car, were given to 
Rosa by law.  
That same morning, Juan kissed Ryan, his 
partner of 21 years, goodbye and headed to his 
job as a file-clerk in that same North Tower.  
Like Rosa, Ryan never heard from Juan again.  
Ryan applied for Workers’ Compensation and 
Social Security, but, unlike Rosa, he was told 
he was not eligible for those benefits because 
he was not Juan’s legal spouse.  Even though 
Juan and Ryan had taken some precautions to 
protect their commitment — such as 
registering as domestic partners, designating 
one another as beneficiaries on insurance 
policies, and executing health care proxies and 
powers of attorney — and even though Juan 
paid the same taxes as John, Ryan was not 
automatically entitled to any of the 
compensations given to Rosa.  In addition to 
his emotional devastation, Ryan was 
financially devastated as well. 
Why did Rosa have an economic safety 
net, while Ryan did not?  The answer can be 
summed up in two words: “I do.”  
By getting married, John and Rosa gained 
access to critical legal protections and benefits 
for couples and their children that provided for 
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them in their time of need.  Married couples 
are entitled to literally hundreds of rights and 
protections that permeate their financial 
relationship, both in extraordinary 
circumstances such as the one mentioned 
above, or in everyday matters, like simply 
renting a car.49 
 
While the couples in this story and the exact details are 
set in a hypothetical scenario, the magnitude of extraordinary 
difficulties same-sex couples endured are real.  Not only were 
same-sex couples victims of 9/11, but they did not have the 
protection mechanism of marriage.50 
Marriage brings with it societal rights and responsibilities, 
economic protection, and expectation exposure.  For 
example, when an individual earns an income, he or she pays 
tax.  When two individuals get married, the total tax payment, 
in general is less than the sum of the taxes paid as 
individuals.  This redistribution of tax is seen as an economic 
benefit to the marriage and can be seen as a cost to society.51  
Therefore, the private individual decision results in a loss of 
                                                 
49 Lambda Legal, Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim Urges California to 
Support Freedom to Marry, Feb. 11, 2002, http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
news/pr/gay-partner-of-911-victim.html (While the details of this story 
are hypothetical, real same-sex couples faced additional hardship because 
they were not recognized as married. One such example of a partnership 
of 11 years, “A gay California man whose partner died in the September 
11 terrorist attacks says the plight he now faces vividly shows why his 
home state must allow lesbian and gay couples to marry. Jeff and I got as 
close to marriage as we could with our domestic partnership,” according 
to Keith Bradkowski. His partner Jeff Collman, was a flight attendant 
killed in the attacks. “But it wasn’t protection enough, and now I am 
legally vulnerable in ways I never imagined.” Id.). 
50 
Id. 
51 Fitzgerald, supra note 30. See also Liz Pulliam Weston, The Myth 
of the Marriage Penalty, available at http://moneycentral.msn.com/ 
content/Taxes/P48908.asp (There are tangible benefits for marriage. 
“Despite complaints about higher taxes on married couples, the reality is 
that more couples get a bonus when they marry than suffer a penalty. Add 
to that legal and financial benefits, and marriage looks like a pretty good 
deal.” Id.). 
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economic revenue to society.52  Society must recuperate this 
loss, in some form, from the married couple.  Defining the 
exact form and cost to the society is at the heart of much 
debate that encompasses the spheres of morality and ethics. 
 
B. Shaping Intimacy by Social Outrage and 
Imposed Morality 
 
Marriage brings with it a protection mechanism within the 
established legal doctrines.53  When two individuals get 
married, they become subjected to a legal framework 
whereby each party inherits a protection mechanism in the 
event of the dissolution of the marriage.  For example, a 
single individual does not have the economic protection of 
being taken care of in case he or she loses his or her 
livelihood.  In the event of a marriage, the more economically 
solvent partner becomes economically responsible for taking 
care of the less economically solvent partner.  This protection 
mechanism afforded to the individual members in a marriage 
comes via the legal framework created to extend and expand 
                                                 
52 See Muller, supra note 31 (Muller suggests that by granting tax 
breaks and legal benefits to the same-sex couple, the   government is 
giving away economic benefits that are not accompanied with any other 
economic benefits and questions the justification of those added expenses 
by the government.  However, the additional cost borne by the 
government in providing tax breaks in a same-sex marriages is more than 
compensated by the economic gain obtained via stabilizing families 
through the recognition of marriage.).  See also M.V. Badgett, The Fiscal 
Impact on the State of Vermont of Allowing Same-Sex couples to Marry, 
IGLSS Technical Report 98-1, October 1998, available at 
http://www.buddybuddy.com/iglss-2.pdf.; Nancy K. Kubasek, Kara 
Jennings, & Shannon T. Browne, Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic 
Partners Statute in an Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 
LAW & SEXUALITY 55 (1997); Jeffery Escoffier, The Political Economy of 
the Closet: Notes Toward an Economic History of Gay and Lesbian Life 
Before Stonewall, in HOMO ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND 
LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 125 (Amy Gluckman and Betsy Reed eds. 1997). 
53 Marriage brings with it a package of legal rights, which will not be 
available otherwise.  By protection mechanisms, the plethora of benefits 
such as health care to tax breaks that are accorded to both spouses within 
the marriage. All these rights come via established laws in the jurisdiction 
of the married couple’s domicile.  
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the institution of marriage within society.  Like corporations 
that extract economic incentives in the form of tax breaks to 
carry out the function of the corporation, there are economic 
incentives offered to individuals involved in a marriage.  
Whenever a married couple extracts economic benefits, the 
net economic benefit to the society as a whole gets reduced.54  
However, while the society loses such economic advantage, it 
attempts to recoup some other benefit from the individuals 
involved in a marriage.55  For example, an unmarried 
individual can enter into multiple romantic relationships, as 
there is no social outrage cost to pay for it.  Whenever the 
same individual gets married, they are prevented by society in 
entering into any other extra-marital romantic relationships, 
as it is frowned upon.  Each individual within a marriage 
must pay this social outrage cost or the acquiescent to the 
morality threshold imposed upon them.  Therefore, whenever 
private intimacy is sanctified by marriage, society imposes a 
cost on the individuals.  How far society can go in imposing 
that cost, or calculating the rent of social outrage, that must 
be paid in order to get married will be considered in the next 
section.   
All individuals in a marriage pay societal rent for 
extracting economic benefits that would not otherwise be 
afforded to them.56  Historically, the nature of that societal 
                                                 
54
 Existing law provides married couples with a slew of economic 
benefits. These benefits are too numerous to mention. For example, by 
being married the couples are entitled to pay less tax compared to what 
they would be paying calculated separately. Since tax revenue goes 
towards social welfare, the loss of revenue reflects as net economic loss to 
the society.   
55 Same-sex couples would lose economic benefit from welfare 
disbursement as a result of obtaining marriage licenses. For a discussion 
on economic impact related to welfare disbursement, see NJ Domestic 
Partnership Act, supra note 21.  See also HYLAND, supra note 21. 
56 When we live in a society, we have to abide by some of society’s 
norms. These norms sometimes could impinge upon our personal 
preferences, restricting our freedom of choice and liberty of expression. 
Therefore, one prerequisite for being part of a society is suppressing one’s 
deeper desires and intimate romantic aspirations. Being subjected to this 
suppression is equivalent to paying a societal rent. Since only 
heterosexuals are allowed to be part of a married community, the societal 
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rent or cost that must be extracted by the said individuals has 
been an issue of heated debate.57  This debate stems from the 
societal conception of morality, ethics, and publicly 
sanctioned behavior.  As society evolved through the ages, 
certain unacceptable behavior became acceptable and 
previously frowned upon practices gained societal approval.  
While the loss of societal outrage is defined by the 
parameters society sets upon the individuals, it is still 
embedded within the limits of the majority’s version of 
morality.58  This threshold of morality has been created 
                                                                                                     
rent is the suppression of same-sex orientation. By paying that rent, 
persons can get the privilege of marriage right.  
57 Here, societal rent is the suppression of same-sex desires. Same-sex 
marriage debate has been taking center stage for quite sometime.  
Extracting that rent means taking an opposing view of granting marriage 
rights to same-sex couples.  
58 
See The Moral Majority Coalition, http://www.moralmajority.com/. 
(An example of a majority view agenda is the political organization 
founded in 1979, the Moral Majority, which pursued a campaign theme of 
conservative evangelical Christian agenda. The Moral Majority was led 
for many years by televangelist Jerry Falwell. The organization’s political 
agenda focused on upholding Christian conservative ideology of the 
moral law. The organization officially dissolved in 1989, but found a new 
face, and a new name under the leadership of another televangelist Pat 
Robertson.  Some of the main campaign issues were outlawing abortion, 
opposition to state recognition and acceptance of homosexuality, and 
elimination of homosexuals.  Prior to his death, Reverend Falwell had 
said:   “[W]e must stop the homosexuals dead in their tracks — before 
they get one step further towards warping the minds of our youth." 
Reverend Falwell, Moral Majority Fundraiser, (Apr. 1, 1981) available at 
http://www.right wingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry_falwe.html); He also 
stated: 
In my age, we laughed at queers, fairies, and anyone 
who was thought to be a homosexual. It was a hideous 
thing, and no one talked about it, much less ever 
confessed to being a homosexual... I believe the United 
States will be destroyed if we permit homosexuality as 
an alternative lifestyle.  
 
Reverend Falwell, How You Can Help Clean Up America available 
at http://www.rightwingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry _falwe.html.  The 
Reverend Falwell further stated, “Can you imagine a regiment of 
homosexual men and lesbian women leading an assault on the Red 
Army? How much respect would the Communists have for such a 
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through centuries of prevalent practices and sociological 
developments.  In my view, this threshold of morality has 
been established without explicitly understanding all facets of 
intimate human behavioral patterns including those that are 
socially innocuous innate human desires.  Who then, is the 
arbiter of the social outrage cost that must be borne by the 
participants of marriage?  Does society have the right to 
impose limits on human intimate behavior, and dictate the 
terms of private human intimacy? 
I will concede that society must extract a cost, when 
private intimate desires are brought under the purview of 
public consequences, because it allows for legal protection 
and social welfare to work for the participants of the 
marriage.  This is also consistent from a traditional, 
sociological perspective, as societies have imposed limits of 
private behavior on marriage.  When married individuals 
derive economic benefits via participating in the legal 
framework, the participants should require a cost that is 
implicit within the economic theory of a cost-benefit analysis.  
Earlier, this article argued that the economic framework of 
the institution of marriage is sustainable without explicit 
identification of gender involved in such unions.  This non-
gender centric view of marriage must therefore be studied in 
the context of social outrage.  As society cannot, however, 
extract cost from marriage by imposing gender-specific 
sanctions in a marriage. 
The limits that society can impose on the institution of 
marriage have a deep-rooted significance within the religious, 
sociological, and historical point of view.  Whenever private 
individual behavior crosses the threshold of such societal 
sanctioned norms, outrage is created.  If the collective 
outrage is such that, it signals the signs of breakdown of the 
traditions of a civilized society, the cost becomes too much to 
pay for the individuals.  
                                                                                                     
collection of perverts." Reverend Falwell, Billings (MT) Gazette, (Mar. 
11, 1981) available at http://www.rightwingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry 
_falwe.html). 
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For example, if a 30-year old man intends to marry an 8-
year old girl,59 the societal outrage cost will be too high for 
the individuals to pay and thus they will not be allowed to 
enter a marriage.  On the other hand, if a 90-year old man 
intends on getting married to a 20-year old girl,60 the outrage 
cost may be high due to the repugnant nature of such 
behavior, but not high enough to disallow the marriage to go 
forward.  Similarly, there are heterosexual couples separated 
by more than two generations of chronological age that can 
enter into marriage, and the institution of marriage is able to 
withstand the social outrage.  Why then must same-sex 
individuals, driven by love for each other, desiring to 
continue their life jointly, be confronted with such societal 
outrage costs that they cannot marry? 
Sociological development over time exhibits evidence of 
society’s implicit approval of various intimate behaviors.  
There is biological evidence61 that supports the assertion that 
the attraction towards members of the same sex is inherent 
                                                 
59 In this example, it would be illegal to marry or have a relationship 
with a child of such age. Age of consent laws have varied by state, but 
have been passed to deter adults from entering into marriage or any sexual 
relationships with people underage. See generally State Age of Sexual 
Consent Laws, available at http://www.actwin.com/eatonohio/ 
gay/consent.htm. See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ch 21(Vernon 2007) 
available at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/docs/PE/content/htm/pe. 
005.00.000021.00.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
60 In this example, it is not illegal to engage in sexual relationship or 
to marry. But, examples exist where society has rejected these 
relationships as authentic.  A publicized relationship in this context was 
the marriage between eighty-nine year old billionaire J. Howard Marshall 
II in 1994 to Anna Nicole Smith when she was twenty-six years old. See 
Charles Lane, Anna Nicole Smith's Supreme Fight: Justices Hear 
Celebrity's Bid for Cut of Late Husband's Riches, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 
2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/28/AR2006022800142_pf.html (Last visited 
Oct. 13, 2007). 
61 On the topic of homosexuality, there are strong sentiments both for 
and against. This is a behavior that can no longer be denied or labeled as a 
mental health issue.  To consider the biological aspect of homosexuality, 
see generally J.M. Bailey & R.C. Pillard, A genetic study of male sexual 
orientation, 48 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 1089-96 (1991).  
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and not driven by aberration or psychological mental health 
issues.62  Rather, homosexuality is viewed: 
 
Like all complex behavioral and mental states, 
homosexuality is…neither exclusively 
biological nor exclusively psychological, but 
results from an as-yet-difficult-to-quantitate 
mixture of genetic factors, intrauterine 
influences...postnatal environment (such as 
parent, sibling and cultural behavior), and a 
complex series of repeatedly reinforced 
choices occurring at critical phases of 
development.63 
 
 If society’s goal is to allow individuals to prosper and 
continue their lives within a collective environment bound by 
contractual arrangements, society must collect rent in return.  
When individuals get societal protection in exchange for 
affordable rent to society, creating rent surplus for certain 
                                                 
62 For many years the psychiatric community had been labeling 
homosexuality as a sexual disorder. However, based in part on research 
and on-going study of homosexual individuals the “APA removed 
homosexuality from DSM-III in 1973; with the 1987 publication of DSM-
III-R, ego-dystonic homosexuality was deleted as well. Thus, 
homosexuality is no longer considered an illness.” See Richard A. Isay, 
M.D., Remove Gender Identity Disorder From DSM, Psychiatric News 
Viewpoints, http://www.psych.org/pnews/97-11-21/isay.html. 
63 JEFFREY SATINOVER, M.D., HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF 
TRUTH, 8 (1996) (The research on homosexuality or same-sex attraction is 
ongoing and there are no absolute explanations why some individuals are 
attracted to members of the same-sex. This article is not intended to 
provide scientific evidence explaining same-sex attraction. Same-sex 
attraction as a substantial number of individuals in the homosexual 
community have proven, they are law abiding, educated, mentally stable, 
and contribute to the welfare of the nation; and could not be viewed as a 
deviant sub-culture of the society.  It is also interesting to note, under the 
U.S. Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, unless a solider 
announces his sexual affinity, there is no way to determine which solider 
is homosexual or heterosexual and are allowed to serve the nation). See 
also Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Revisited, 
University of California (2006), available at 
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/ rainbow/html/military.html. 
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members of the society is not equitable nor is it justified.  
Here, denial of marriage rights of equality to certain members 
of society can be seen as imposing a high rent for providing 
them the protection umbrella of marriage.  The argument that 
society cannot continue to impose such high rent on 
individuals, leads to the conclusion that marriage rights 
should be extended to same-sex couples.  Furthermore, 
societal outrage analysis of marriage reveals that, denial of 
marriage rights to same-sex couples is not based on any 
fundamental belief.  Instead, it is borne out of an exclusionary 
philosophy of denial of equal rights. 
 
C. Regulating Intimacy or Limiting Private 
Desires 
 
By deciding to live in a society, individuals implicitly 
enter into a contract to abide by some of the society rules and 
regulations.  Implicit within the limits of ordered society, 
resides a conglomeration of thresholds that shape the patterns 
of society sanctioned intimate behaviors.64  Though evidence 
of individuals of same-sex relationships has been in existence 
since the birth of civilization, this intimate behavior has not 
received the sanction of a marriage.  Does society have the 
right to regulate such intimate behavior, particularly when 
these intimate behaviors are not impinging on others’ 
exercise of free will, and are not inconsistent with biological 
or social behaviors witnessed throughout the ages all over the 
world?65 
                                                 
64 In this context, thresholds refer to the barriers to individual 
freedoms. These barriers shape the socially accepted behavior based on 
majority’s acceptance. Although individual members of the society are 
predominantly free to act, they cannot always do what they want. 
Similarly, a threshold has been placed on the right to marry. When a 
person is legally permissible to marry only the members of opposite sex, 
there is a threshold placed on that person. By not allowing the individual 
to marry the person of her choice, the threshold is not only limiting her 
behavior but also developing a predictable pattern.  
65 
See Paul Halsall, Homosexuality in History: A Partially Annotated 
Bibliography, Version 3.12, Sept 7, 2000, available at 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh/gayhistbib.html#c3. 
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How does society regulate intimacy?  Most individuals 
within a society try to adhere to the limits of socially 
sanctioned behavior for fear of outrage or societal backlash.66  
Often times, an individual realizes early in his life that he is 
attracted to the members of the same-sex, but understands the 
public shame that is placed upon such behavior.  Thus, he 
intentionally hides his sexual feelings and suppresses his 
pursuit of finding a partner of his choice and settles in a more 
socially acceptable behavior of getting married with a 
woman.  Is this not intimate behavior being limited by 
society?67 
Earlier this article explained how private intimate 
behavior and romantic desires get sanctioned by marriage.  It 
is, therefore, most individuals’ objective, in some form or 
other, to bring their private desires into the public eye, 
thereby finding legitimacy in their existence.  If, however, 
some individuals are prevented from bringing their private 
romantic aspirations into the collective sphere of societal 
acceptance for fear of being unacceptable, isn’t this society 
regulating intimate behavior? Especially, if the intimate 
behavior in question is not harming anyone, not sanctioning 
such relationships should be considered the real social 
outrage, rather than the pursuit of such relationships.  
Therefore, by not legalizing the marriage between same-sex 
consenting adults that choose to be in intimate relationships, 
is indeed proving that society regulates intimacy.  On the 
other hand, merely not legalizing such marriage is in no way 
limiting privacy.  The rights to privacy are not implicit in its 
recognition of a marriage, but reside in its explicit ability to 
carry out such behavior without fear of legal consequences. 
Finally, as society evolves where the frontiers of privacy, 
individual liberty, and free choice, have been extended much 
more than before, it is to the ultimate benefit of  society not to 
                                                 
66 
See generally Ann Ferguson, Gay Marriage: An American and 
Feminist Dilemma, 22 HYPATIA  1, 39-57 (2007). 
67 
See Complete Works of Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, supra note 
1. (Like the Romeo and Juliet saga, societal disapproval, family 
disapproval, and legal disapproval prevent individuals from publicly 
proclaiming their love in a recognized union of marriage). 
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impose artificial limits of acceptable behavior. This is 
especially true if such behavior is born out of a flawed 
concept of morality or emerges as a derivative of the 
majority’s morality injected into the minority.  History has 
proven that repression of individuals does no good for 
society, as repressed individuals do not contribute fully to the 
welfare of collective advancement.68  Regulation of intimacy 
or imposing artificial limits represses individuals.  Therefore, 
society must advance and do away with such regulatory 
mechanisms and allow individual expression of sexual 
orientation to flourish as long as such expression is centered 
on harmless loving behavior. 
 
IV.   CREATION OF NEW RIGHTS: PROMISE OF LAWRENCE   
AND BEYOND  
 
As we enter the early phase of the 21st century, we are 
emboldened by the expansion of individual liberty and rights 
of privacy in vast aspects of life.  Yet, the marriage rights for 
same-sex couples remain a distant dream due to judicial non-
acknowledgement in most parts of the nation.  Amidst a lot of 
soul-searching and warring factions trumpeting their 
justifications on various grounds, same-sex couples have not 
achieved marriage equality, with the exception of 
Massachusetts whose highest court has granted same-sex 
couples the right to marry.  The issue of same-sex marriage 
has percolated through the state and federal court systems.69  
This contentious issue has been debated on various grounds 
from suspect class,70 to the Equal Protection Clause,71 to 
                                                 
68 I have discussed in detail the role repression plays in impacting an 
individual and how the relationships among repression, collective 
mechanism, and society eventually shape the development of societal 
standards and collective aspirations. See Saby Ghoshray, Chapter 
Fourteen: Symmetry, Rationality and Consciousness: Revisiting 
Marcusean Repression in America’s War on Terror, Eros and Liberation: 
Herbert Marcuse’s Vision For A New Era, Penn State University Press, 
2006 (Forthcoming). 
69 
See cases cited supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
70 A particular group of people could be considered members of a 
“suspect class” if law categorizes them as suspect and therefore provides 
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them with greater judicial scrutiny.  The issue of whether to make the 
members of the same-sex community a suspect class depends on whether 
homosexuality can be considered an immutable behavior or a matter of 
choice. Scientific evidence has demonstrated that attraction to members of 
same-sex is in part biologically based, yet the judiciary has historically 
denied the “suspect class” status on the homosexuals. Historically, the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend “suspect class” status to 
groups other than women and racial minorities. See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47 (1985) (the Court 
refused to make the developmentally disabled a suspect class. Justice 
Marshall noted in his partial concurrence in City of Cleburne that the 
Court does appear to examine the City of Cleburne's denial of a permit to 
a group home for mentally retarded people with a significantly higher 
degree of scrutiny than is typically associated with the rational-basis test. 
Id. at 447-50.).  See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (The 
Court revisited the issue of “suspect class” again here, where it struck 
down a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy on substantive due 
process grounds. By taking resort to the development in the City of 
Cleburne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion, 
that by prohibiting only homosexual sodomy, and not heterosexual 
sodomy as well, Texas’s statute did not meet rational-basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Justice O’Connor may have applied a 
slightly higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis, but the Court as 
a whole did not really extend suspect-class status to sexual orientation. In 
her opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor also relied on the Court’s 
decision in Romer v. Evans (1996) that struck down a Colorado 
constitutional amendment aimed at denying homosexuals “minority 
status, quota preferences, protected status or [a] claim of discrimination.” 
O’Connor’s invocation of Romer is significant as Romer seemed to 
employ a markedly higher level of scrutiny than the nominal application 
of the rational-basis test. Id.)   
Based on the current composition of the Court, it is highly probable, 
therefore, that the Court may not explicitly apply heightened scrutiny to 
homosexuals any time soon, although it may decide about the 
constitutionality of laws prohibiting the same-sex marriages.  It has also 
been argued that discrimination based on sex should be interpreted to 
include discrimination based on sexual orientation, in which case 
intermediate scrutiny (higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis 
test) could apply to same-sex rights cases.  Just recently, the Supreme 
Court of the state of Washington went out of its way to declare members 
of the homosexual community not a minority, homosexuality not an 
immutable characteristic, homosexuals not a suspect class.  The court 
states, “The plaintiffs have not established that they are members of a 
suspect class or that they have a fundamental right to marriage that 
includes the right to marry a person of the same sex.” See Heather 
Andersen and Leslie Christian, et. al. v. King County, State of 
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fundamental rights of the rational basis,72 and still the judicial 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage remain the same.  Several 
states have come quite close to bringing marriage rights to 
same-sex couples, but still remain unconsummated.73  
Consider a very poignant question: Would the judiciary ever 
end the legal prohibitions on same-sex marriage?  Same-sex 
couples are everywhere; we interact with them everyday.  
They are our neighbors, our colleagues, our priests, and our 
soldiers.74  We find same-sex couples even among the highest 
offices within our government.  A compassionate father, 
Vice-President Dick Cheney states, “Lynne and I have a gay 
                                                                                                     
Washington, et. al, No. 75934-1 (July 26, 2006) (Justice Barbara A. 
Madsen majority opinion) available at http://www.courts.wa. 
gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/759341opn.pdf (the debate over whether or not 
members of the same-sex community are a suspect class is far from over).  
71 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV (The doctrine of “equal protection" 
states that any law that is otherwise constitutional, is a valid law and 
therefore, must be applied equally to all persons. Sometimes, however, 
this equal application of law results in asymmetrical and unequal 
outcomes for various identifiable groups. A question repeatedly raised is, 
how to achieve the intended meaning of "equal protection" so that 
everyone is entitled to the same outcome.  Relying on this "equal 
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, some jurisdictions give 
same-sex spouses the same access to his or her "partner's" company's 
health-insurance plan as a spouse in a traditional marriage. However, the 
judiciary is still far removed from applying this doctrine universally in 
recognizing a same-sex marriage on the same basis as traditional 
marriage.) 
72 
See Ghoshray, supra note 68. 
73 
See Status of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 9, and accompanying 
text. 
74 See Lewis, 188 N.J. at 453 (The Supreme Court:  
Gays and lesbians work in every profession, business, 
and trade. They are educators, architects, police 
officers, fire officials, doctors, lawyers, electricians, and 
construction workers. They serve in township boards, in 
civic organizations, and in church groups that minister 
to the needy. They are mothers and fathers. They are 
our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends. In light 
of the policies reflected in the statutory and decisional 
laws of this State, we cannot find a legitimate public 
need for an unequal legal scheme of benefits and 
privileges that disadvantages committed same-sex 
couples.  Id.  
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daughter, so it’s an issue our family is very familiar with.  
With the respect to the question of relationships, my general 
view is freedom means freedom for everyone. ... People 
ought to be free to enter into any kind of relationship they 
want to.”75  Shouldn’t we listen to this father’s appeal to 
recognize his daughter’s right to marry?  Why then, are they 
not recognized as married couples in the majority of the 
country?  What will it take to recognize the rights of same-
sex couples to marry?  Does it require the creation of new 
constitutional rights hitherto unrecognized?  Will these rights 
ever be validated via a legislative process?  Can our two 
hundred year old Constitution comprehend the expansive 
meaning of intimacy and love in the 21st century?  Answers 
to these profound questions of law, fundamental values, 
legality, and matters of the heart will be explored in the next 
section. 
 
A. Creation of New Rights or Going Beyond 
Unenumerated Rights 
  
Despite making tremendous inroads in expanding their 
rights in the last two decades, the proponents of same-sex 
rights are yet to receive the ultimate recognition:  The 
recognition sanctified by marriage.  Since the landmark 1986 
Supreme Court decision of Bowers v. Hardwick,76 which 
upheld a Georgia State Law77 prohibiting homosexual 
                                                 
75 
See Associated Press, Cheney At Odds with Bush on Gay Marriage, 
(Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5817720/. 
76 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (noting that the denial of homosexual rights was based on a 
careful consideration of historic tradition, in which states consistently 
intervened in homosexual conduct on the grounds of moral and ethical 
standards). Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). (dismissing Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning 
on grounds of historical inaccuracy and improper relevance. In Lawrence, 
Justice Kennedy explained that historical traditions could be taken into 
consideration only up to a certain extent, echoing his earlier findings in 
Lewis. Id. (discussing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72)).  
77 
See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law, which criminalized oral and 
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sodomy, both sides of this same-sex marriage debate have 
been active.  On one side, the opponents of same-sex rights, 
through their elected national and state legislatures have 
attempted to retain the traditional definition of marriage, first 
through the passage of federal and state Defense of Marriage 
Acts (DOMA),78 and recently through the legislative process 
of the National Elections held November 2, 2004.  These 
elections resulted in 11 states voting to amend their 
Constitutions and ban same-sex marriage.79  
 
The amendments won, often by huge margins, 
in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and Oregon — the one 
state where gay-rights activists hoped to 
prevail. The bans won by a 3-to-1 margin in 
                                                                                                     
anal sex between consenting adults.)  But cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 
(holding that such sodomy laws were unconstitutional). 
78 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (codified 
at 1 U.S.C. §7, 28 U.S.C. §1738C) (The DOMA is a federal law designed 
to give states the right to refuse recognition of a same-sex marriage 
approved by another state. It also defines marriage as a union between a 
man and woman for the purposes of federal law. The Act was introduced 
by Republican Rep. Bob Barr of Georgia, in May 1996. The bill passed 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate and later President 
Clinton signed the bill on Sept. 21, 1996. The Act focuses on two key 
components. The first, is the authority given to states, that “No state, 
territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other state, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other state, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.” Id. §1783C.  The second component deals 
with the federal definition of marriage as an institution between one man 
and one woman, with the word "spouse" referring only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or wife, Id. §7(a)). 
79 
See Rona Marech, The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage: One Year 
Later Both sides claim victory, but courts will decide, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/02/12/MNG8ABA7RC1.DTL. 
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Kentucky and Georgia, 3-to-2 in Ohio, and 6-
to-1 in Mississippi.80  
 
On the other side, the same-sex rights advocates have 
gone through the reversal of Bowers and through a series of 
court decisions that nearly opened the door to gain full 
equality in marriage rights, as they journeyed from tolerance 
to acceptance, to public endorsement.81  While the 
continuation of denying same-sex marriage rights was 
disheartening, it still remains an issue in the forefront of 
same-sex couple’s dialogue and continues seeking equality. 
As we look beneath the surface and examine the Supreme 
Court’s decision on same-sex rights, the apparent reversal of 
same-sex rights in Bowers was an aberration in the Court’s 
continuous expansion of the frontiers of individual rights and 
privacy.  The journey began in Griswold v. Connecticut, 82 in 
which the Court extended the limits of intimacy and rights of 
consenting adults, unlocking the door to sexual pleasure and 
                                                 
80 Associated Press, Campaign 2004: 11 States Ban Same-Sex Marriage, 
CBS News Nov. 2, 2004,  available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2004/09/30/politics/main646662.shtml. 
81 Same-sex couples still struggle to gain tolerance, acceptance or 
even approval by society. A recent poll details that “… of 1,002 adults 
May 8-11 shows that by a 58-39 percent margin American adults oppose 
redefining marriage to include homosexuals. Additionally, 50 percent 
favor and 47 percent oppose a marriage amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.” See Michael Foust, Gallup poll: 58 percent oppose 'gay 
marriage,' half support amend, Baptist Press, May 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=23295.  
82 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the 
constitution protects the right to privacy. The ruling was based on an 1879 
Connecticut law, which prohibited the use of contraceptives or drugs that 
were for the sole purpose of preventing conception.  Justice Goldberg 
wrote a concurring opinion, relying on the Ninth Amendment to support 
his findings. Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he relied 
on the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. Justice 
Byron White also relied on the due process clause in his concurring 
opinion.); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that abortion 
was a private decision between a woman and her doctor. For the most 
part, the Court in the subsequent rulings relied on Justice Harlan's 
substantive due process opinion). 
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sexual release between married couples.83  Thus, by 
separating the procreative idealism of marriage from the right 
to intimacy, the Court opened up a new frontier to expand the 
definition of marriage in the first place.  The Court extended 
the right to privacy to unmarried couples while untangling 
“private sin” from “public crime” in Eisenstadt v. Baird.84  
Although, the Court was quick, during this long march to 
liberation, to separate procreative and unitary idealism of 
marriage for sex, it took longer to extend these rights to 
same-sex couples.  The Court needed a deeper understanding 
of the human person, the complexities of human 
anthropology, as it revealed in the poignant “mystery 
passage” of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,85 where it held:  
 
These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.86  
                                                 
83 
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., Concurring 
Opinion). 
84 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that a 
Massachusetts law which criminalized the distribution of contraceptives 
to unmarried people was unconstitutional). 
85 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania laws 
regulating abortion. The Court held the right to have an abortion and 
lowered the standard on the restrictions of that right).  
86
 Id.  at 851.  See also Kevin J. Hasson, God and Man at the Supreme 
Court: Rethinking Religion in Public Life, The Heritage Foundation, Oct. 
14, 1997, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Religion/ 
HL599.cfm (Much has been written about this opinion and the inner 
message of Justice Kennedy's words. These words provide a glance into 
the Supreme Court’s thoughts.  It can be argued however, Justice 
Kennedy, like the early philosophers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, 
is the present day philosopher. His rulings are formed on the 
“predominant assumptions about the great ideas—about God and man, 
about the nature of society and the state, of freedom and responsibility, 




Perhaps this deeper understanding of human existence 
could have helped the Court in making its decisions to 
provide them with the rights that adult married and unmarried 
heterosexuals have taken for granted for decades.  
The journey from Bowers to Lawrence was a predictable 
one.  In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun almost derived 
Lawrence’s constitutionally protected enumerated right from 
Griswold’s interpretation of fundamental rights: 
 
The fact that individuals define themselves in 
a significant way through their intimate sexual 
relationships with other suggests, in a Nation 
as diverse as ours, that there may be many 
‘right’ ways of conducting their relationships, 
and that much of the richness of a relationship 
will come from the freedom an individual has 
to choose the form and nature of these 
intensely personal bonds.87 
 
Justice Stevens concluded Justice Blackmun’s unfinished 
business by explicitly linking a married couple’s right to 
engage in non-procreative sex with partners of the same-sex 
having intimate sexual encounters; “The essential ‘liberty’ 
that animated the development of the law in cases like 
Griswold and Eisenstadt … surely embraces the right to 
engage in non-reproductive, sexual conduct that others may 
consider offensive or immoral.”88  The promise of Lawrence, 
however, remains unfulfilled, as we continue to search for 
equality in the right to choose one’s partner for marriage, 
long after having attained the equality of right to engage in 
sexual intimacy.  
                                                                                                     
and so forth.” Further, “America's public philosophy is uniquely 
influenced by Supreme Court decisions.” Id. But, there are naysayer’s that 
discount the substantive nature of his opinion and dismiss it as mere 
judicial hubris.). 
87 
See Ghoshray, supra note 68, at 205. 
88 
Id. at 217. 
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By delving into the framework of enumerated rights of 
the Constitution, the unfulfilled promise of Lawrence to bring 
marriage equality for same-sex couples becomes more 
transparent.  If Lawrence has settled the issue of same-sex 
intimacy under the premise of enumerated rights, then why 
can’t the same enumerated rights doctrine be extended to 
those seeking the rights to marry their same-sex partner?  On 
the surface, it seems that an originalist’s viewpoint would be 
that same-sex marriage rights are not necessarily protected by 
the Constitution under the enumerated rights doctrine.  This is 
because the originalist interpretation of the Constitution 
mandates, protecting those rights, which are actually located 
in the Constitution.89  A more dynamic constitutional 
interpretation,90 however, would suggest a different 
                                                 
89 
See Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court Citation: 
Dissecting Originalism, Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism, 
69 ALB. L. REV. 709 (2006) (detailing the various shades and hues of 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution). 
90Here we are confronted with the issue of strict constructionist vs. 
dynamic constitutional interpretation. Dynamic constitutional 
interpretation argues for the need to expand the meaning of constitutional 
clauses as a result of changing values and complex sociological 
dimensions. The changing realities based on the evolving nature of our 
understanding of human existence makes it incumbent upon all of us to 
extricate ourselves from the frozen, static-in-time version of the 
Constitution to embrace a more dynamic Constitution. By referring to a 
dynamic Constitution, attention is drawn to the process by which the 
Constitution adapts to the changing conditions in the society. As the 
frontiers of the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, the rights to 
privacy and sexual practices among consenting adults continue to expand 
within the meaning of our Constitution, we are confronted with its 
dynamic aspect. In most parlances, the dynamic Constitution and the 
living Constitution is used synonymously. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., THE 
DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-2, 12-13, 269 (2004). See also Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (The term living is used to denote that the 
Constitution is still evolving in consonance with the evolving needs of the 
society, rather than possessing a fixed in time, definitive meaning. The 
concept of a living Constitution is noted by the Court in Trop: "[T]he 
words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is 
not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 
100-01 (discussing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  See 
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conclusion than that espoused by an originalist, support of 
which can be gleaned from an expansive reading of The Bill 
of Rights.  The Bill of Rights was originally created to protect 
liberty from the corrosive impact of any governmental or 
republican interference. Implicit in the concept of the Bill of 
Rights resides the guarantee that there are some rights so 
fundamental, either the government or the legislature can 
never regulate them.  Therefore, no majority, no matter how 
large, could violate the rights of individuals.  These are 
indeed the enumerated rights.  
The framers of the Constitution however agreed that there 
could not possibly be an exhaustive list of enumerated rights, 
and thus, they created unenumerated rights.91  Could we 
                                                                                                     
also Thurgood Marshall, Justice, United States Supreme Court, Annual 
Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association 
(May 6, 1987), available at http://www.thurgoodmarshall. 
com/speeches/constitutional_speech.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).  
(The concept of a living Constitution further gained currency in 
Marshall’s lecture titled, The Constitution: A Living Document, where he 
argued that the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the moral, 
political and cultural climate of the age of interpretation.). See also Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, United States Supreme Court, Keynote 
Address Before the American Society of International Law Annual 
Meeting (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/ 
AM05/ginsburg/050401.html. See also Ghoshray, supra note 89, at 101-
52.  
91 The Bill of Rights contained numerous rights called enumerated 
rights, which are different than unenumerated rights. While the 
enumerated rights are explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
unenumerated rights have not been explicitly mentioned, but the Supreme 
Court had long held that the Constitution protects those rights. The 
difficulty in distinguishing between enumerated rights and unenumerated 
rights has created significant constitutional confusion. Unenumerated 
rights are retained by the people. Commenting on unenumerated rights, 
Randy Barnett says, “The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure 
that all [enumerated and unenumerated] individual natural rights had the 
same stature and force after some of them were enumerated as they had 
before; and its existence argued against a latitudinarian interpretation of 
federal powers.” RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003).  See also, JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2006) (1980) (John Hart Ely asserts that these rights come from a broad 
principles of democratic process and equality and democratic process.).  
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presume that anything that is not explicitly protected by the 
Constitution as such is an unenumerated right?  Rights not 
specifically enumerated therefore, may be limited, or 
legislatively rendered insignificant if a majority or their 
representatives see fit.  What then, is the purpose of the Ninth 
amendment?92 According to the Bill of Rights, unenumerated 
rights are protected under the Ninth Amendment?93  Does 
that mean then these types of rights are subject to the whims 
and interpretations of the lawmakers and their governments?  
This is absolutely unconscionable, and doing so would render 
the entire concept of unenumerated rights meaningless and 
interpret the Ninth Amendment as an extra-terrestrial 
encroachment into the Constitution.  Could the right to marry 
by same-sex couples be a good example of unenumerated 
liberties within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment?  In 
this context, when states act to protect liberty, either through 
state Constitutions or via legislative measures in the state 
legislation, they act to protect rights explicitly recognized 
                                                 
92 See U.S. CONST. Amend. IX  (addresses the rights of the people 
that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. “The enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.” Id. See also Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 481 (Justice Arthur Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Brennan expressed the opinion that the Ninth Amendment is relevant to 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight 
amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and 
fundamental rights.... I do not mean to imply that the .... 
Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of 
rights protected from infringement by either the States 
or the Federal Government....While the Ninth 
Amendment - and indeed the entire Bill of Rights - 
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, 
the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the States as well from abridging fundamental 
personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, in 
indicating that not all such liberties are specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely 
relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental 
personal rights, now protected from state, as well as 
federal, infringement. Id.). 
93 U.S. CONST. Amend. IX. 
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within the Constitution but not created by the Ninth 
Amendment.  Clearly, the framers believed that every 
possible right could be recognized in the Constitution by 
means of constitutional interpretation but they cannot be 
explicitly created.  Therefore, we are all entitled to 
fundamental rights that the government must recognize and 
that the purpose of the governments is to protect those rights.  
Therefore, all rights are recognized by government, not 
created by government.  
The challenge with this argument then revolved around 
determining what a right is and is not.  Otherwise, we create a 
situation where anybody who wants to do anything can claim 
that they have a right to do so.  For example, an individual 
could say they have the right to drive with blaring music 
pounding through their neighborhood at two a.m.  We can 
have noise ordinances or driving restrictions to prohibit that, 
but the person claiming that right would say, “If I am entitled 
to this right, then you can’t pass an ordinance to strip me of 
that right.”  It would then be up to the courts to decide as to 
whether there is a right to an individual to either drive with a 
cranked up stereo at two a.m. or there exists no such right. 
While the explicitly listed rights are clearly recognized, 
there ought to be some adjudication process to determine 
what the unlisted rights that can be recognized are.  In the 
above example, what is going to stop the driver with the 
cranked up stereo from asserting his rights, “This is a right 
that you must recognize.”  Therefore, the challenge comes 
from ascertaining what is a legitimate unenumerated right and 
what is not.  It is against this backdrop that an analysis is 
needed to consider the issue of same-sex marriage and the 
rights of equality for all couples regardless of their sexual 
orientation.  Under what circumstances do unenumerated 
rights become binding on the government such that the 
majority could neither regulate nor violate?  How do we go 
about discerning between a legitimate and illegitimate 
assertion of an unenumerated right?  We cannot deny the fact 
that there will be disagreements over what is and is not 
legitimate.  The right of marriage to same-sex couples falls in 
that category.  Who should be the moral arbiter to determine 
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whether this right should be bestowed upon same-sex couples 
or not?  Who determines if this right is a legitimate right?  
The proponents of natural rights believe that all issues of 
unenumerated rights must be determined on the basis of 
natural rights, the rights that are embedded in the 
presumption of liberty.94  
Although the Ninth Amendment provides us a protective 
umbrella of presumption to all other exercises of liberty, this 
presumption of liberty interpretation does not get us close to 
an understanding of whether the right to same-sex marriage is 
an enumerated right.  Otherwise, several state Supreme 
Courts would not have denied these equality rights to same-
sex couples.95  
The problem of interpreting the Ninth Amendment arises 
from the confusion surrounding the definition of rights, 
specifically to know what rights should be protected.  Here, 
the Ninth Amendment cannot be solely relied on for support 
to identify which rights are protected and which rights are 
not.  Should this then be decided by the judiciary and allow 
the Justices the right to pick and choose what rights the Ninth 
Amendment covers and what rights it does not?  This 
                                                 
94 
See BARNETTE, supra note 91 (In his noteworthy commentary, 
Randy Barnett describes this presumption of liberty:  
As long as they do not violate the rights of others (as 
defined by the common law of property, contract and 
tort), persons are presumed to be “immune” from 
interference by government. This presumption means 
that citizens may challenge any government action that 
restricts their otherwise rightful conduct, and the burden 
is on the government to show that its action is within its 
proper powers or scope. At the national level, the 
government would bear the burden of showing that its 
acts were both “necessary and proper” to accomplish an 
enumerated function, rather than, as now, forcing the 
citizen to prove why it is he or she should be left alone. 
At the state level, the burden would fall upon state 
government to show that legislation infringing the 
liberty of its citizens was a necessary exercise of its 
‘police power’ - that is, the state’s power to protect the 
rights of its citizens… Id. 
95 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 645 (1993). 
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particular point is to emphasize that the doctrine of 
unenumerated rights should be read to interpret that the 
government interference in regulating certain individual 
liberties should be rejected outright.  With this caveat, 
however, these individual liberties must not interfere with 
other established enumerated rights by other individual 
citizens.  Several such unenumerated rights have been firmly 
established within a broader constitutional interpretation, 
although there may not be explicit mention of those rights 
within the Constitution.   
For example, there is no “right of free association” 
enumerated in the Constitution, yet the Courts have long 
recognized that there is such a right and no one has 
challenged it.  Why therefore, can the same not be said about 
the right to marry for same-sex couples?  Earlier this article 
has shown that the law and economic theory of marriage is 
not inconsistent with same-sex couples obtaining marriage 
rights.  The Supreme Court has already established the 
uniqueness of human existence and the conception of human 
liberty goes far beyond our hackneyed ideals of morality and 
contemporary ethics.  These liberated ideals and expanded 
conceptions of humanity should, therefore, shape our views 
on fundamental rights.  If we can establish the mutual 
exclusivity of the rights of same-sex couples to marry with 
other established and recognized individual rights, we have 
come far in our explication of the nature of rights for 
constitutional adjudication. 
The Supreme Court has already taken the procreative 
component out of the definition of marriage, and has stripped 
the exclusivity component from the rights of enjoying sexual 
pleasure.  Recently, through Lawrence, the Courts have taken 
the provision of the sexual orientation from the rights to 
privacy.  Providing the right to marry to same-sex couples 
will be a continuation of such ideals, which is rightfully 
consistent with the last several decades’ constitutional 
development in individual rights and privacy.  The concept of 
unenumerated rights has evolved through various 
interpretations, whether in the words of the Framers of the 
Constitution about the proper aims and legitimate powers of 
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government96 or in the natural rights philosophy based 
interpretation of the presumption of liberty.97  Emanating 
from these expansive doctrines and liberal ideals is the view 
that enumerated rights assertion to the rights to marry by 
same-sex couples, is not inconsistent with constitutional 
objectives.  
Did Thomas Jefferson think that same-sex couples had 
rights to marry when he provided us with this eloquent 
explication, “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness?”98  Or, did Mr. 
Jefferson, when defining the limits of legitimate law within a 
free society, envision that there exists, among us, with 
aspirations and human desires, a section of our brethren, who 
find themselves hopelessly perched at the outlier of our legal 
firmament? 
 
Of liberty I would say that, in the whole 
plenitude of its extent, it is unobstructed action 
according to our will.  But rightful liberty is 
unobstructed action according to our will 
within limits drawn around us by the equal 
rights of others.  I do not add ‘within the limits 
of the law,’ because law is often but the 
                                                 
96 Such examples of interpretation of the constitution are found in The 
Federalist Papers. The authors of the Federalist Papers intended to both 
influence ratification and future interpretations of the Constitution. The 
original eighty-five articles were compiled and formed the Federalist 
Papers, which urged the ratification of the United States Constitution. 
They were published beginning in October 1787. The Federalist Papers 
serve as an important constitutional interpretive tool, as they outline the 
philosophy and motivation of the newly formed government. See Primary 
Documents in American History, The Federalist Papers, Library of 
Congress, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html. 
97
 See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (Supreme Court illuminated this 
concept); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 
(1992). 
98 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, pmbl (U.S. 1776), available at 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm. 
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tyrant’s will, and always so when it violates 
the right of an individual.99  
   
When the Framers penned their thoughts on fundamental 
rights, enumerated rights, and unenumerated rights, they were 
not oblivious to homosexual behavior, as, homosexuality has 
been with humanity since the dawn of time.  It is plausible 
the Framers could have had a limited scope of understanding 
on the biological, physiological, and sociological mechanisms 
behind homosexuality, as even in modern times, we struggle 
with understanding homosexuality.  Nonetheless, they were 
not blind to it.  
Now, the understanding of human existence, and the 
fundamental rights that go to the very core of human 
existence have evolved in the last two hundred years since the 
Constitution was first enacted.  Although this aging document 
has done a good job of providing the judiciary the tools to 
uphold basic fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, questions could be raised as to whether it is 
time to create new rights.  It appears we remain hopelessly 
deadlocked as to the assertion of unenumerated rights in the 
profound issue of extending the equality of marriage rights to 
all citizens.  We remain fiercely contentious as to how far we 
could expand the frontiers of our evolving conceptions of 
liberty, privacy, and the rights to intimacy, when it comes to 
assert legal acceptance to same-sex couple’s right to the 
pursuit of happiness.100  Are legislative changes needed in the 
existing constitutional amendments to properly capture the 
meaning of human existence as revealed in the mystery of 
human life discussed earlier?101  Might this debate be 
captured within the evolving constitutional adjudications in 
                                                 
99 
See Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government, Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, 1819, available at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0100.htm. 
100 By referring to the Jeffersonian spirit embedded in the invocation 
of “pursuit of happiness,” the question is whether minorities belonging to 
specific sexual orientation could be excluded from attaining that 
happiness.  
101 This refers to the mystery passage. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
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the legal arena that centers on a debate between originalism 
vs. dynamic constitutionalism?102  
                                                 
102 
See Ghoshray, supra note 89, at 716-27 (Essentially, Originalism 
refers to the Constitutional interpretation that seeks the meaning that was 
intended by the Framers for the society when it was written.  By 
discerning the historical meaning of the terms used—the originalist avoids 
any fanciful analysis of the Framers’ mind to uncover a hidden 
interpretation. Sometimes the originalist ideology is manifested in its 
reliance on textualism, the interpretive process that interprets the law 
based on the text and tradition of the Constitution, without focusing on the 
moral or intellectual compass of the society or individual.  Anchored in 
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, the textualist seeks the 
most literal meaning, free from the perceptive idealism of broader social 
purpose). See also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The 
Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (1998) (reviewing 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997)) (noting how Justice Scalia rejects the use of common 
sense principles when the plain language of the rule is clear); Donald J. 
Kochan, The Other Side of the Coin: Implications for Policy Formation in 
the Law of Judicial Interpretation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463, 
464–66 (1997); Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1789, 1790–92 (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia’s deep commitment to a 
formalist jurisprudence). By referring to a dynamic Constitution, attention 
is drawn to the process by which the Constitution adapts to the changing 
conditions in society.  As the frontiers of the freedom of speech, the 
freedom of religion, the rights to privacy and sexual practices among 
consenting adults continue to expand within the meaning of our 
Constitution, we are confronted with its dynamic aspect.  In most 
parlances, the phrases “dynamic Constitution” and “living Constitution” 
are used synonymously.  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2001) (explaining that the 
Constitution provides principles that the Court identifies and implements 
“through a highly moralized, philosophic inquiry According to Justice 
Ginsburg, the Constitution ought to be read as belonging to a global 
twenty-first century, not as fixed forever by eighteenth century 
understandings). See Ginsburg, (Apr. 1, 2005), supra note 90 (quoting 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), Justice Ginsburg invokes 
the immortal words of Justice Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr.:  
[W]hen we are dealing with words . . . [in] the 
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that 
they have called into life a being the development of 
which could not have been foreseen completely by the 
most gifted of its begetters. . . .  The case before us must 
be considered in the light of our whole experience and 
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.  
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Marriage rights for same-sex couples have been debated 
for several decades without judicial validation.  Does it then 
require the creation of new enumerated rights, such that the 
fundamental nature of that right is so profound that denial of 
such right will pass the “shock and conscience” test103 of the 
constitutional adjudication?  To give a marriage right to any 
minority member of society does not require the creation of 
new rights, it requires keeping the implicit promise of 
guarantying fundamental rights to all citizens.  It requires 
delving into the bottomless crevices of the Constitution’s 
expansive meaning, a meaning that must evolve with the 
time. 
As the understanding of human nature has evolved so has 
the appreciation for individual human desires and aspirations.  
This allowed the broadening of frontiers of privacy rights, as 
seen over three decades of settled law in Bowers being 
invalidated in Lawrence.  The journey that began in 
Griswold, opening the door to privacy rights, continued on in 
Roe v. Wade,
104 creating a newer enumerated right of 
reproduction for women.  Thus, the arrival of Lawrence was 
no judicial accident, rather the culmination of a historical 
journey by the American judiciary into the expansive domain 
of bringing recognition to individual private desires and 
romantic aspirations.  That the implicit promise of Lawrence 
has not yet materialized into procuring marriage rights for 
same-sex couples is disheartening, but not shocking.  
Although Lawrence provided a renewed appreciation of the 
anthropological complexities of human kind and provided us 
                                                 
103 
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (The 
‘shock and conscience’ test was popularized after Justice Felix 
Frankfurter writing for the U.S. Supreme Court established the ‘shock-
the-conscience test’, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against states depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.” This test attempts to determine whether an 
action/behavior fall outside the standards of civilized decency. The test, 
however, has its distracters that criticize permitting judges to assert their 
individual views on what constitutes shocking).  
104 
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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with a deeper understanding of substantive due process,105 it 
did not solve the constitutional inadequacies of separating 
enumerated rights from the unenumerated rights.  Looking 
into the historical evolution of constitutional jurisprudence 
surrounding private rights and public acceptance, I see no 
reason why provisions of marriage for same-sex couples 
should not be lifted on multiple grounds.  It is not the 
majority’s opinion that should be counted while deciding 
matters of grave public interest, rather the consistency in the 
direction of change that must be taken into consideration as 
held by Justice Stevens who eloquently articulated a newer 
national consensus standard based on the “consistency of the 
direction of change that has been demonstrated in Roper v. 
Simmons.”106  
If the current framework of rights, fundamental or 
enumerated, is too narrow to legitimize marriage rights for 
same-sex couples, the alternatives must be sought to create a 
                                                 
105
 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); For a 
further explanation on Substantive Due Process, see Wikipedia, Due 
Process: Substantive Due Process Basics, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_process [follow “Substantive Due 
Process Basics” link] (The legal description of Substantive Due Process is 
the fundamental constitutional legal theory upon which many privacy 
rights are based. The doctrine of Substantive Due Process holds that the 
Due Process Clause not only requires “due process,” that is, basic 
procedural rights, but that it also protects basic substantive rights. 
“Substantive” rights are those general rights that reserve to the individual 
the power to possess or to do certain things, despite the government’s 
desire to the contrary. These are rights, like freedom of speech and 
religion. “Procedural” rights are special rights that, instead, dictate how 
the government can lawfully go about taking away a person’s freedom or 
property or life, when the law otherwise gives them the power to do so. 
Modern substantive due process doctrine protects such 
rights as the right to privacy, under which falls rights of 
bodily autonomy, private sexual activity (Lawrence v. 
Texas), contraception (Griswold v. Connecticut), and 
abortion (Roe v. Wade), as well as most of the 
protections of the Bill of Rights. However, what are 
seen as failures to protect enough of our basic liberties 
and what are seen as past abuses and present excesses 
of this doctrine continue to spur debate over its use. Id.) 
106 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005). 
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new set of constitutional rights.  To ensure equality amongst 
all members of society, we must not fret over the explicit 
creation of new rights, as long as that right does not infringe 
on other fundamental rights.  Obviously, as we evolve as a 
society where multitude of diverging interests and desires 
interact with renewed aspirations and empowerment, the 
societal fabric may always be confronted with new 
challenges.  As long as the developments of new 
empowerment are not in direct conflict of other fundamental 
rights, we must not vacillate from the path of creation of such 
newer fundamental rights.  Implicit in these new rights, reside 
the promise of equality for all. 
 
B. Judiciary vs. Legislature: Who Decides? 
 
The recent New Jersey ruling in Lewis v. Harris and the 
subsequent legislative development brings the realization that 
the right to marry by the same-sex couple might indeed come 
down to a legislative decision, as the judiciary becomes 
increasingly apprehensive of ruling against settled law in the 
land.  The problem with this scenario is that it will almost 
certainly become impossible in America for any legislature to 
lift the provision against same-sex marriage and grant 
marriage rights to same-sex couples.  This is where the 
futility of exploring legislative avenues in securing this 
important fundamental right lies. 
The issue must be analyzed in two threads.  First, an 
explicit determination must be made as to whether this is a 
legislative right or a judicial constitutional right.  This issue is 
intrinsically linked to the resolution of who can create new 
rights.  Second, we must be cognizant of the practical 
limitations under which the legislative branch works.  The 
right to marry by any individual is a fundamental right deeply 
ingrained in the humanities eternal yearning to be equal and 
to be recognized.  The right to marry is a fundamental human 
right, and no fundamental human right is based on the gender 
of that individual.  Therefore, the issue is not who grants or 
determines such rights, rather why that right remained 
unattainable to a sizable portion of the population.  
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Furthermore, the right to marry must be determined through 
the judicial process, as the legislature is hopelessly ill 
equipped to deal with such a deeply fundamental matter of 
personal rights and private matters.  Implicit in the 
recognition of our private intimate matters comes prejudicial 
predisposition and religious underpinnings.  As a result, the 
general public is divided in their opinion on this issue and the 
political process is dependant on the majority’s view.  
However, it is not the majority’s view that must be adhered to 
in this context; rather a significant directional change should 
be the indicator of change. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
 
This article deconstructs the traditional view of marriage 
as an opposite-sex only union and presents a nexus of 
contract interpretations of marriage, which supports the right 
of same-sex couples to marry.  Detouring away from the 
hackneyed ideals of marriage, marriage equality must be 
extended to all people regardless of sexual orientation.  
Examining the economic realities of marriage, there is no 
budgetary hurdle that justifies keeping the same-sex couples 
outside of the protective umbrella of marriage.  All empirical 
evidence provides strong indication that society can extract 
net economic gain by extending marriage rights to its same-
sex couples.  
Extending the theory of contract to define marriage, the 
institution of marriage is structurally similar to the nexus of 
contract arrangements of a corporation, and as a result its 
viability is inconsistent with a sexual-orientation bias.  The 
review that marriage’s dynamic decision making and 
deliberately incomplete bargaining model is consistent with 
the incomplete contract paradigm.  Therefore, this strictly 
constructionist view of marriage is consistent with the idea of 
bestowing marriage rights to same-sex couples, as the 
structural arrangement of the institution is robust against 
gender or sexual orientation. 
As private romantic aspirations culminate into marriage, 
individuals bring their intimate desires into public square.  
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Entry to this public square must not be limited by sexual 
orientation.  Same-sex marriage challenges many of society’s 
long held beliefs and comes into a collision course with the 
majority’s morality.  However, even society’s cost of moral 
outrage cannot justify keeping same-sex couples outside the 
exclusivity of marriage.  
Delving into the archives of America’s constitutional 
history the frontiers of privacy and the rights to equality are 
expanding continuously.  Yet, these liberal ideals of the 
Constitution are hopelessly ill equipped to recognize 
marriage rights for same-sex individuals.  Debate rages on 
through the court system, through the legislatures, through 
the legal scholarship, grappling over what right must 
encapsulate same-sex couple’s ability to marry.  From a 
constitutional perspective, extending marriage rights to same-
sex individuals may not require creating new rights; rather it 
requires fulfilling the promise of recognition to the 
unenumerated rights. 
The journey from Griswold to Lawrence has been long 
and arduous.  Lawrence’s promise of equality may not have 
been fulfilled, yet each constitutional turning point gets us 
closer to developing a full understanding of human existence 
and of human personhood.  Implicit in this human 
understanding is the recognition of same-sex orientation, not 
as a choice, rather as an immutable uniqueness in man’s 
evolution.  Caught in the web of unattainable love are those 
unique immutable individuals amongst us, yearning for 
equality and approval.  Granting social approval to same-sex 
couples will not only require deviation from the path nestled 
deeply in American historical traditions, but also rewrite 
Shakespeare’s saga of two star-crossed lovers, haunted 
forever by their unobtainable, unrecognized love.  While the 
beloved Juliet could never gain social approval for her love of 
Romeo, we could learn from antiquity’s mistakes.  Do we 
have the courage?   
